Source identification in image forensics by Marra, Francesco
PhD Thesis
DIETI, University Federico II of Naples
Dottorato in Information Technology and Elettrical Engineering
XXX Ciclo
Source identification in
image forensics
Francesco Marra
Tutor Co-Tutor
Prof. Carlo Sansone Prof. Luisa Verdoliva


Contents
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction 1
1 Learning-based source identiﬁcation 7
1.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Proposed approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Co-occurrence based local features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 CNN for model identiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.1 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.2 Experiments on natural images . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.3 Experiments on iris sensor images . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Blind source clustering 37
2.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2.1 PRNU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.2 Correlation clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
iii
2.2.3 Consensus clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 Two-step source clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.1 Pre-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.2 Correlation clustering of noise residuals . . . . . . . 52
2.3.3 Consensus clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.4 Reﬁnement step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.1 Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Forgery localization in a blind scenario 75
3.1 Camera-based Forgery Localization Framework . . . . . . . 76
3.1.1 Residual-based image clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1.2 Camera ﬁngerprint estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.1.3 Camera assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1.4 PRNU-based forgery localization . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.1 Image clustering and PRNU estimation . . . . . . . 83
4 Feature-based counter forensics 89
4.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Forgery Detection Counter-Forensics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.1 Limited knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.2 Perfect knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.3 Greedy sampling algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Conclusion 107
iv
List of Tables
1.1 Digital camera models used in our experiment, all cameras
are taken from Dresden Image Database. . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2 The dataset of iris camera models used in the experiments. 19
1.3 Performance of various descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database for whole images and for 512×512 crops. . . . . . 23
1.4 Confusion matrix for the s2 minmax32 feature. . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Performance of various descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database for uncompressed and JPEG compressed images
at various QFs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Robustness of various descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database w.r.t. compression and resizing. . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.7 Performance in the limited knowledge case for the s2 min-
max32 (color) feature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.8 Performance in the limited knowledge case for the s2 min-
max32 (color) feature with feature selection (500 instead of
1875 components). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.9 Results on zero knowledge scenario using original images. . 30
1.10 Results on zero knowledge scenario using compressed images. 31
v
1.11 Performance of CNN-based descriptors on the Dresden Im-
age Database for diﬀerent size of crops. . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.12 Results of diﬀerent model identiﬁcation approaches on the
test set by varying the size of input images. . . . . . . . . . 34
1.13 The confusion matrix obtained by the proposed approach. . 36
2.1 Cameras of Dresden dataset with original and Facebook sizes 60
2.2 Performance on heterogeneous sets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Performance on homogeneous sets. For each model all avail-
able devices and images are used. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Performance on heterogeneous sets after high quality up-
loading on Facebook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5 Performance on heterogeneous sets after low quality upload-
ing on Facebook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.6 Comparison among ensemble clustering tools. . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Performance of clustering algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Detection performance on original and JPEG compressed
images. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1 Performance indicators for the S3SPAM-based detector, PK
scenario, averaged over 100 test images. . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.2 Performance indicators for the LBP-based detector, PK sce-
nario, averaged over 100 test images. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3 Performance indicators for the S3SPAM-based detector, LK
scenario, averaged over 100 test images. . . . . . . . . . . . 105
vi
List of Figures
1 Granularity levels in forensic source identiﬁcation. . . . . . . 2
2 The digital image acquisition chain left a so-called device
ﬁngerprint on each acquired image. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 Source identiﬁcation performed in a perfect knowledge sce-
nario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4 Source identiﬁcation performed in a blind scenario. . . . . . 5
1.1 The proposed CNN architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Samples of iris images coming from diﬀerent sensors of our
dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 Zero knowledge scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4 Iris images captured by diﬀerent sensors and at diﬀerent
distances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Example of cropping iris images for data augumentation. . . 35
2.1 Correlation Clustering applied to a toy example. . . . . . . 43
2.2 The ensemble clustering problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3 Distribution of cross-camera (red) and same-camera (green)
correlations. The correlations are computed among individ-
ual noise residuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
vii
2.4 Distribution of cross-camera (red) and same-camera (green)
correlations. The correlations are computed among indi-
vidual noise residuals and camera PRNUs estimated on 50
residuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Block diagram of the proposed blind-PRNU clustering method 51
2.6 Graphical representation of clustering results on the B.1
dataset with HQ facebook images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.7 Graphical representation of clustering results on the B.1
dataset with HQ facebook images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1 A framework for PRNU-based forgery localization in a blind
scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 Clustering results on original images and JPEG compressed
images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3 Forgery localization results on original (top) and JPEG com-
pressed images (down) with forgeries of 256×256 (left), and
128× 128 pixels (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Results for clustering-based and naive solutions on original
(left) and JPEG compressed images (right) with 256× 256
pixel forgeries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.1 Examples of forged images and their original counterpart . . 90
4.2 Typical workﬂow of an LD-based machine learning detector. 96
4.3 Limited knowledge and perfect knowledge strategies . . . . 98
4.4 A single step of the propose greedy procedure. . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 Main performance indicators on image 35 of the test set for
the PK (left) and LK (right) scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6 Output image after counter-forensic attacks in the PK (left)
and LK (right) scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
viii
Introduction
Source identiﬁcation is one of the most important tasks in digital im-
age forensics. In fact, the ability to reliably associate an image with its
acquisition device may be crucial both during investigations and before
a court of law. For example, one may be interested in proving that a
certain photo was taken by his/her camera, in order to claim intellec-
tual property. On the contrary, it may be law enforcement agencies that
are interested to trace back the origin of some images, because they vio-
late the law themselves (e.g. do not respect privacy laws), or maybe they
point to subjects involved in unlawful and dangerous activities (like terror-
ism, pedo-pornography, etc). More in general, proving, beyond reasonable
doubts, that a photo was taken by a given camera, may be an important
element for decisions in court.
The growing interest towards camera identiﬁcation is also a conse-
quence, on the other hand, of the capillary diﬀusion of imaging devices,
and of the widespread diﬀusion of images on the net. It is estimated that
in 2014 more than 1.8 billion images and videos have been published each
day, and this trend does not seem to be slowing down. The analyst may
seek information at various levels, from the type of source (camera, scan-
ner, etc.), to its brand/model (e.g. iPhone6 vs iPhone7), to the individual
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Figure 1. Granularity levels in forensic source identiﬁcation.
device, as shown in Fig.1 [1]. The identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc acquisition
device is often desired, but not always possible and in that case it makes
sense to work at a higher level of granularity. A possible approach to re-
cover the source device information of a media is to look at the meta-data
headers itself, e.g. the exchangeable image ﬁle format (EXIF) of a photo-
graph. Unfortunately, these headers can be easily removed or counterfeited
even by a beginner forger using simple editing tools.
The key assumption of forensic source identiﬁcation is that acquisition
devices leave traces in the acquired content, and that instances of these
traces are speciﬁc to the respective (class of) device(s). This kind of traces
is present in the so-called device ﬁngerprint (Fig.2). The name stems from
the forensic value of human ﬁngerprints. In the ideal case, the device ﬁn-
gerprint has two properties: diversity and stability. The diversity requires
that it is unique and not shared among diﬀerent camera models or devices,
while stability requires that the ﬁngerprint remains the same over time.
A major impulse to research in this ﬁeld came with the seminal work
of Lukas et al. [2] showing that reliable device identiﬁcation is possible
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Figure 2. The digital image acquisition chain left a so-called device ﬁnger-
print on each acquired image.
based on the camera photo-response non uniformity (PRNU) pattern. This
is a multiplicative noise component caused by the inhomogeneity of sili-
con wafers and imperfections of the sensor manufacturing, which, in turn,
cause a non-uniform sensitivity to light among the sensor photo-diodes.
This means that a pixel could be slightly brighter or darker than expected
by camera design, and each pixel is individually aﬀected by this issue.
Each camera is characterized by its unique PRNU pattern, which can be
regarded as a sort of camera ﬁngerprint. All photos taken by a given cam-
era carry traces of its ﬁngerprint which, under suitable hypotheses, can
be retrieved, enabling reliable device identiﬁcation and, with some further
processing, also brand and model identiﬁcation [3]. Camera brand and
model identiﬁcation are based also on the other traces left by the internal
processing steps, like the lens aberration, the demosaicing algorithm, the
CFA and the compression matrix. Of course, the device ﬁngerprint itself
must be known in advance, or estimated from a large set of photos taken
by the desired source, a restrictive hypothesis that limits somewhat the
applicability of this approach.
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Figure 3. Source identiﬁcation performed in a perfect knowledge scenario.
In this scenario the ﬁngerprint of the image under test is compared to a
known ﬁngerprints extracted from a reference labelled data.
The device identiﬁcation problem takes diﬀerent forms depending on
the prior knowledge available. If the target image may only come from one
of a given number of cameras, whose device ﬁngerprint is known in advance
or can be accurately estimated, identiﬁcation reduces to a classiﬁcation
problem [2, 4, 5]. This is called perfect knowledge scenario (Fig.3). In a
limited knowledge situation with a more challenging open set scenario, the
target image may also come from unknown sources [6] and the problem
is to understand whether it was acquired by one of the known cameras
(possibly just one) or not [7]. Often, however, the analyst has only a set of
images without any information on the possible device involved [8]. In this
zero knowledge scenario the only approach is to perform a blind clustering
of the images respect to their source (Fig.4).
Camera model identiﬁcation and PRNU-based estimation can be also
used for image forgery detection. This is also a very hot topic in these
recent years, given the availability of modern and powerful image editing
software tools. Almost everyone can produce dozens of new digital pictures
each day and share them through social networks. For the large majority,
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Figure 4. Source identiﬁcation performed in a blind scenario. Here we have
no labelled data, and we want to extract from the single-image ﬁngerprints as
much information as possible. For example here, we cluster the data respect
to the device that took the images.
they are genuine images, however they are often manipulated and diﬀused
with malicious purposes, like inﬂuencing the public opinion or discrediting
people. Such attacks are becoming more and more frequent and sophis-
ticated, raising a serious alarm over the general trustfulness of multime-
dia assets. Many techniques, especially machine-learning ones, have been
proven to be a successful approach to deal with this task [9]. However,
an expert adversary could be able to fool them. Counter-forensics is the
research ﬁeld that studies forensic techniques, ﬁnds their weak points, and
tries to exploit them to fool forensic approaches. It is therefore important
to discover even the weakness of forensics tools in order to take speciﬁc
actions and propose ever more robust techniques.
Motivated by the importance of the source identiﬁcation in digital im-
age forensics community and the need of reliable techniques using device
ﬁngerprint, the work developed in this PhD thesis concerns diﬀerent source
identiﬁcation level, using both feature-based and PRNU-based approach
for model and device identiﬁcation. In addition, it is also shown that
counter-forensics methods can easily attack machine learning techniques
for image forgery detection. The thesis is hence organized so as to devote
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a chapter to these diﬀerent problems. In more detail,
Chapter 1 deals with feature-based techniques for camera model iden-
tiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, an analysis of hand-crafted local features and deep
learning ones will be considered for the basic two-class classiﬁcation prob-
lem. In addition, a comparison with the limited knowledge and the blind
scenario will be presented. Finally, an application of camera model iden-
tiﬁcation on various iris sensor models will be shown.
Chapter 2 faces the problem of device source identiﬁcation using the
PRNU-based approach in a blind scenario. With the use of the correlation
between single-image sensor noise, a blind two-step source clustering is
proposed. In the ﬁrst step correlation clustering together with ensemble
method is used to obtain an initial partition, which is then reﬁned in the
second step by means of a Bayesian approach. Experimental results show
that this proposal outperforms the state-of-the-art techniques and still
give acceptable performance when considering images downloaded from
Facebook.
Chapter 3 presents an application of forgery localization in a blind
scenario. The source image clustering algorithm presented in chapter 3
is used in a realistic scenario to carry out image forgery detection when
PRNU is not available.
In Chapter 4 it is presented a counter-forensics technique based on
a greedy strategy that attacks a machine-learning based method using
handcrafted features. The analysis is carried out on a synthetic datasets
of forged images and shows that a malicious attacker can easily fool the
detector using the proposed approach.
Chapter1
Learning-based source
identiﬁcation
Camera model identiﬁcation relies on the distinctive traces left in im-
ages by the processing steps carried out inside modern cameras. In fact,
in digital cameras, the output image is obtained by applying a number
of sophisticated algorithms, each characterized by several free parameters.
Well-known examples are demosaicing, based often on complex adaptive
nonlinear interpolation, and JPEG compression, where the quantization
matrix can be deﬁned by the user. Each camera model is characterized
by its own combination of in-camera algorithms. It is highly unlikely that
diﬀerent camera models, even of the same brand, use the very same set
of algorithms and parameters and, therefore, very likely that their traces
allow reliable identiﬁcation.
In literature there are a number of papers that try to solve the problem
looking for artifacts related to speciﬁc in-camera processing steps, trying
to estimate their unknown parameters. However, a blind approach is also
possible, where no hypothesis is made on the origin of camera-speciﬁc
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marks, and the identiﬁcation task is regarded simply as a texture classi-
ﬁcation problem. With this approach, the focus shifts on the deﬁnition
of the most discriminative features, irrespective of their physical meaning.
Both global and local features can be considered, drawing often from the
vast literature of closely related ﬁelds, such as material classiﬁcation or
steganalysis. Recently, the use of deep learning and CNNs permits to ex-
tract such feature directly learning from the data the useful feature that
permit to distinguish between camera models. This so-called data driven
approach needs a big labeled dataset for training but guarantee a big im-
provement on performance.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate a class of such feature on diﬀerent
scenarios. First a perfect knowledge scenario is considered where we have
information of the camera model source of the images in our dataset. Then
a limited knowledge and zero knowledge scenarios are taken in account.
In addition both a blind and data driven feature are proposed. The
ﬁrst uses the co-occurrences of image residuals [10] assessing their po-
tential for the camera model identiﬁcation task. It is worth noting that
co-occurrence based local features have been also applied recently [11], to-
gether with some features proposed in [3]. In [12] we have tested the very
same approach, starting from a state-of-the-art denoising ﬁlter [13], and
found it to be inferior to that based on simple high-pass ﬁltering. In this
preliminary results only grayscale images were used, and only a perfect-
knowledge scenario was considered.
A data driven based on CNN is also proposed. Respect to other CNN-
based approaches recently proposed [14, 15], the goal is to keep the net
relatively small, to be used on small datasets and to keep the complexity
quite low. Since for training they need a full labeled dataset, only a perfect
knowledge scenario is considered.
In the next Section we review model identiﬁcation methods based on
both in-camera speciﬁc, blind and data-driven features, then, in Sec-
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tion 1.2, we describe the co-occurrence based one proposed in [16] and the
CNN used in [17]. Experimental analysis on the Dresden Image Database,
is carried out in Section 1.4 considering various scenarios of interest. Fi-
nally, in Section 1.5 we show the application of model identiﬁcation in the
context of as iris sensor model recognition.
1.1 Related work
For solving the problem of camera model identiﬁcation, two diﬀerent
approaches were used. The ﬁrst try to exploit the artifacts related to
speciﬁc in-camera processing steps, using hand-crafted features. The sec-
ond approach uses blind-features, sometimes borrowed by other ﬁelds, for
solving the camera model identiﬁcation task.
Model-based artifacts were recognized also in early research on PRNU-
based identiﬁcation [3], during the PRNU pattern estimation, and used
to identify the camera model. This path has been followed later also by
other researchers with diﬀerent type of features [11, 18]. In [19], inspired
by the work of Popescu and Farid on image forgery detection [20], traces
of diﬀerent interpolation algorithms where sought and used as distinctive
model features. In fact, interpolation algorithms modify in speciﬁc ways,
both in space and across color channels, the natural correlation between
each pixel and its neighbors. Therefore, the weights of the interpolation
kernel, once estimated, can be used as features for camera identiﬁcation.
Often, they are combined with frequency domain features, that take into
account the periodic artifacts caused by the color ﬁlter array (CFA) pat-
tern. The strong dependencies among pixels has been also explored in
[21] and [22]. In [21], in particular, as also in [23], weight estimation is
conducted locally on each color band using a content-adaptive procedure
for each region. This reﬂects the fact that, often, adaptive demosaicing
techniques are used inside the camera to reduce blurring artifacts. In [22],
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instead, partial second-order derivative correlation models are proposed to
detect both the intra-channel and the cross-channel dependencies due to
demosaicing. Other methods aim at characterizing JPEG compression ar-
tifacts [24], DCT coeﬃcients statistics [25], or lens distortion artifacts like
chromatic aberration [26]. A diﬀerent approach is proposed in [27] where
identiﬁcation is based on a two-parameter heteroscedastic noise model valid
for raw images.
Kharrazi et al. [28] in 2004 considered the use of generic features for
camera identiﬁcation. This was one of the ﬁrst papers to present an ap-
proach that did not focus on a speciﬁc camera artifact, but tried to capture
the underlying variations between camera models based on statistics of var-
ious orders. The authors propose to use several global statistics, extracted
from each individual color band, based on the correlation of couples of
color bands, and also extracted from some wavelet subbands. In addition,
some Image Quality Metrics (IQM), previously used in [29] for steganaly-
sis, are evaluated on all the color bands, both in the spatial and transform
domain. It is important to underline that these last features are computed
on residual images (high-pass ﬁltered versions of the original data). These
features have shown good performance also for cell phone identiﬁcation
tested with both images and videos [30].
Image residuals are used by the majority of methods proposed in the
literature. The reason is that in this way results become independent
of the image content, hence artifacts are more easily detected. In [31]
IQM features are extracted from high-pass residuals of each color band.
These features are then combined with BSM (Binary Similarity Measures),
i.e., LBP (Local Binary Pattern) [32] extracted from the least-signiﬁcant
bit planes, and with an enlarged set of features computed in the wavelet
domain. Besides the features used in [28], other ﬁrst-order statistics are
computed, as well as some inter-band correlation indexes inspired by [33].
In order to improve performance Gloe [34] proposes to add some color
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features to those used in [28]. Eﬀectively, experiments on the Dresden
Image Database prove this combination to guarantee a performance gain
w.r.t. both [28] and [31].
Most of the above described features are evaluated globally on the
whole image (both original and high-pass ﬁltered) or on a decimated ver-
sion of it, if wavelet subbands are considered. However, in order to capture
subtle image patterns which may correspond to discriminative features, it
is important to consider local features, extracted from a small neighbor-
hood of each pixel of the image. This idea inspires the work in [35] where
LBP features are evaluated both on the original image and on some resid-
uals. A similar approach is followed recently also in [36]. Note that in [35]
LBP is computed on two-pixel supports, and hence encodes only ﬁrst-order
spatial variations. Computing it after a preliminary high-pass ﬁltering, as
done in [37], is instead equivalent to use a larger support and evaluate
higher-order statistics. A diﬀerent approach looks for the statistical diﬀer-
ences in the DCT domain by computing Markovian transition probabilities
[38].
Recently, the promising performance obtained in various computer vi-
sion tasks with the use of deep learning inspired various work on model
identiﬁcation using CNNs [14, 15]. In [15], using a deep learning approach,
the authors train a multi-class CNN for extracting discriminant feature for
model identiﬁcation followed by an SVM trained using patches extracted
from training images.
1.2 Proposed approaches
In this section we explain in detail the two kind of approaches pro-
posed for camera model identiﬁcation. A blind local feature, based on
co-occurrence of image residuals, are ﬁrst described. Then a data-driven
and deep learning approaches using CNN is presented.
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1.3 Co-occurrence based local features
The analysis of the state of the art shows that local descriptors can
provide precious clues for camera model identiﬁcation. Moreover, since
such clues, related to the camera processing chain, are contained in the
image micro-patterns and not in the scene content, it makes sense to re-
move the latter and work on image residuals. Even in this framework,
however, two main open issues remain about i) how to extract informative
image residuals and ii) how to process them in order to obtain an ex-
pressive camera-related feature. Given the complexity and the variety of
the in-camera processes involved, no conclusive answer can be hoped for.
However, we will show that co-occurrence based local features, computed
on image residuals, and originally proposed in [10] for steganalysis, may
represent a valuable tool for this task. A similar path was successfully used
in digital image forensics [39] [9] [40].
The feature vector associated with the image under test is extracted
by means of the following steps:
 computation of residuals through high-pass ﬁltering;
 quantization and truncation of the residuals;
 computation of the histogram of co-occurrences.
In [10] a number of linear and non-linear high-pass ﬁlters have been
used for the computation of residuals, and all resulting feature vectors
have been combined by means of an ensemble classiﬁer. In [12], instead,
inspired also by [40], only a few ﬁlters have been selected for the model
identiﬁcation purpose, after a preliminary performance analysis on the
training set. In both cases, the input was a gray-scale image, obtained by
suitably combining the three color components. Individual color channels,
however, are involved in all in-camera processes, and may contribute more
1.3. CO-OCCURRENCE BASED LOCAL FEATURES 13
information than their combination. Hence, it makes sense computing co-
occurrences based on these richer sources, provided that enough data are
available to carry out reliable estimates.
With this aim, we consider the color-aware features proposed in [41]
and [42]. In both cases, image residuals are computed separately for each
color channel, while diﬀerences arise concerning which co-occurrences are
taken into account. In [41] each color band is processed individually, hence
only spatial co-occurrences are considered. Several co-occurrence matrices
are computed, one for each color channel and each spatial direction, and
they are eventually merged in a single feature vector. In [42], instead,
only inter-channel co-occurrences are computed, taking also into account
the Bayer CFA conﬁguration of the image. Therefore, we considered both
approaches, and performed some preliminary tests in order to select the
best solution. It turned out that, for the model identiﬁcation problem,
processing the color channels independently from one another provides
better and more stable results, so we consider the approach of [41] in the
following.
Filter names are built as in [10] to reﬂect their main characteristics,
that is
name = s{order}_{type}{f}{σ}{scan} (1.1)
where order is the ﬁlter order, the type can be linear, called spam, or min-
max, with the latter case meaning the the output of multiple ﬁlters are
combined through nonlinear min and max operations, f is the number of
ﬁlters used, σ a symmetry index (indicating the number of diﬀerent resid-
uals that can be obtained by image rotation or mirroring), and scan may
be h (horizontal), v (vertical) or missing (this accounts for hv-symmetrical
residuals). As already said, after some experiments, we focused on a small
number of ﬁlters, i.e., linear ﬁlters of the second and third order and a
minmax ﬁlter based on the output of multiple second order ﬁlters. Let us
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focus for the moment on the second order ﬁlter, s2_spam12hv, deﬁned by
rhi,j = xi,j−1 − 2xi,j + xi,j+1 (1.2)
where x represents a generic color band of the input image (red, green or
blue), and rh the corresponding residual image, with the superscript h in-
dicating the scanning direction. A similar deﬁnition applies, with obvious
changes, for rvi,j . However, by symmetry, r
h and the transpose or rv have
the same statistics, so they are concatenated in a single residual image r,
thus augmenting the data for co-occurrence computation. In order to ob-
tain manageable co-occurrence matrices, residuals are quantized/truncated
to a small number of values as:
rˆi,j = truncT (round(ri,j/q)) (1.3)
with q the quantization step and T the truncation value, which in this
work are set to q = 1 and T = 2, respectively. The co-occurrences are
computed on four pixels in a row aligned along the horizontal (along ﬁlter)
and vertical (cross ﬁlter) directions
Ch(k0, k1, k2, k3) =
∑
i,j
I(rˆi,j = k0, rˆi,j+1 = k1, rˆi,j+2 = k2, rˆi,j+3 = k3)
(1.4)
Cv(k0, k1, k2, k3) =
∑
i,j
I(rˆi,j = k0, rˆi+1,j = k1, rˆi+2,j = k2, rˆi+3,j = k3)
(1.5)
where I(A) is the indicator function of event A, equal to 1 if A holds and
0 otherwise.
With the selected parameters, each of these matrices have 625 entries,
which are reduced to 313 by symmetry. Considering the three color chan-
nels, the f a fully manageabinal s2_spam12hv feature vector obtained
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through concatenation has 3×2×313=1878 components,le length for the
typical size of modern images.
The same processing steps are used to extract features based on other
ﬁlters, with only minor changes. Actually, when the third order ﬁlter,
s3_spam14hv, is considered, deﬁned as
rhi,j = xi,j−1 − 3xi,j + 3xi,j+1 − xi,j+2 (1.6)
no modiﬁcation to the process is necessary, and the only observable diﬀer-
ence will be in the eventual performance.
On the contrary, the third features we consider, s2_minmax32, require
some further considerations. The min residual image rmin is computed
by taking, at each pixel, the minimum output of four linear ﬁlters (of
the second order in our case) operating along rows, columns and the two
diagonals (main, md, and anti, ad)
rmini,j = min(r
h
i,j , r
v
i,j , r
md
i,j , r
ad
i,j) (1.7)
A similar deﬁnition applies to rmax, where the maximum instead of the
minimum is taken. Due to directional symmetry, only two co-occurrence
matrices need be computed, one for rmin and one for rmax, which are
eventually merged. After concatenating the three color-band matrices,
the ﬁnal feature vector has 3×625=1875 components. In all cases, the
extracted features are eventually used to train an SVM linear classiﬁer.
1.3.1 CNN for model identiﬁcation
The architecture of the network proposed for the identiﬁcation is de-
scribed in detail in Fig. 1.1. It is an adapted and reduced version of the
AlexNet [43]. Moreover, for keeping low the number of parameters, the
computational complexity (both in training and testing phases) and the
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Convolutional layers (feature extraction) Classification layers
(Fully connected layers)
conv1 
kernel: 7x7
stride: 1
pool1
kernel: 4x4
stride: 2
conv2
kernel: 5x5
stride: 1
pool2
kernel: 3x3
stride: 1
conv3
kernel: 3x3
stride: 1
pool3
kernel: 2x2
stride: 1 fc1 fc2 fc3
+ + +
Feature maps: 8 Feature maps: 16 Feature maps: 32
Figure 1.1. The proposed CNN architecture
memory required. It is made up of three convolutional layers for feature
extraction followed by three fully connected layers for the classiﬁcation.
All the convolutional layers are made up of a convolution, followed
by the activation function and a pooling operation. We use the Rectiﬁed
Linear Units (ReLUs) as non-linearity activation function and the max
function as pooling. The chosen convolutional layers has a decreasing ker-
nel size for both the convolutional and pooling, while an increasing feature
map size. The ﬁrst layer is made up of a convolution with a kernel 7× 7
and a pooling of 4×4, that produces 8 feature maps of the selected patch
of the original iris image. The second layer is composed by a convolution
with a kernel of 5×5 and a pooling of a kernel 3×3 that produces 16 feature
maps. Finally, the third layer with a convolution with a kernel 3× 3 and
a pooling of 2× 2 produces the ﬁnal image representation of 32 features
map.
The fully-connected layers fc1 and fc2 have 1024 and 2048 neurons
respectively and ReLUs as activation function. The last fully connected
layer (fc3 ) has the same number of neurons of the available models in the
dataset, and, ﬁnally, a softmax function is used for classiﬁcation.
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1.4 Experimental results
In order to assess the performance of the described feature for cam-
era model identiﬁcation, we carried out a number of experiments on two
diﬀerent kind of images: natural images and biometrics sensor one. For
the ﬁrst, we will use the well-known Dresden Image Database [44]. In the
ﬁrst part of the experimental analysis we show the comparison of various
blind feature-based proposed for camera identiﬁcation analysing the per-
formance at various level of knowledge. Then, we show the performance
gain given by the use of CNN on model identiﬁcation. For the biometrics
sensor images, we will use a collection of Iris sensor images. In the analysis,
we will show that the features used for natural images perform very good
on biometrics sensor, and will use a CNN-based approach proposed by us
in [17] for iris sensor.
1.4.1 Datasets
1.4.1.1 Natural images
The Dresden Dataset is one of the most widespread database in the
forensics ﬁeld, used in many recent papers. As shown in Table 1.1, 26 dif-
ferent camera models are available, often with several individual devices,
and several hundred photos. A limited set of scenes is selected, and por-
trayed over and over across diﬀerent models, devices and settings. This is
unique characteristic of the Dresden Image Database, which makes it espe-
cially suitable for the model identiﬁcation problem, as it frees experimental
results from the randomness due to varying image content.
1.4.1.2 Iris images
For evaluating the performance, we consider some publicly available
iris databases. Since there is not one single database explicitly made for
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Make Model #Devices Images size #images
Agfa DC-504 1 4032 x 3024 169
Agfa DC-733s 1 3072 x 2304 278
Agfa DC-830i 1 3264 x 2448 363
Agfa Sensor505-X 1 2592 x 1944 172
Agfa Sensor530s 1 4032 x 3024 372
Canon Ixus 55 1 2592 x 1944 224
Canon Ixus 70 3 3072 x 2304 567
Canon PowerShot A640 1 3648 x 2736 188
Casio EX-Z150 5 3264 x 2448 924
Kodak M1063 5 3664 x 2748 2391
Nikon CoolPix S710 5 4352 x 3264 925
Nikon D200 2 3872 x 2592 752
Nikon D70/D70s 2/2 3008 x 2000 736
Olympus µ1050SW 5 3648 x 2736 1040
Panasonic DMC-FZ50 3 3648 x 2736 931
Pentax Optio A40 4 4000 x 3000 638
Pentax Optio W60 1 3648 x 2736 192
Pratika DCZ5.9 5 2560 x 1920 1019
Ricoh GX100 5 3648 x 2736 854
Rollei RCP-7325XS 3 3072 x 2304 589
Samsung L74wide 3 3072 x 2304 686
Samsung NV15 3 3648 x 2736 645
Sony DSC-H50 2 3456 x 2592 541
Sony DSC-T77 4 3648 x 2736 725
Sony DSC-W170 2 3648 x 2736 405
Σ 25 74 16956
Table 1.1. Digital camera models used in our experiment, all cameras are
taken from Dresden Image Database.
the model identiﬁcation task, with various models and vendors, we built a
dataset by merging all or parts of the model from each selected database.
In Table 1.2, we report the nine models used and the four original
databases from which they come, as well as the number of images and
their size. In Figure 4, we show some images coming from diﬀerent sensor
models. In the following we recall some of the characteristics of the four
considered databases.
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The ATVS-FIr DB1 is an iris dataset from the ATVS Biometric Recog-
nition Group. It was ﬁrst made for liveness detection since it contains both
real and fake examples form LG Iris Access EOU3000.
The CASIA-IRISV2 and CASIA-IRISV42 are provided by the biomet-
rics research at Center for Biometrics and Security Research (CBSR), Na-
tional Laboratory of Pattern Recognition (NLPR), Institute of Automa-
tion, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CASIA). The CASIA-IRISV2 includes
two diﬀerent devices the Irispass-h, developed by OKI and a self-developed
device, named CASIA-IrisCamV2, while the CASIA-IRISV4 is collected
by using a Irispass-h sensor and IKEMB-100 dual-eye iris camera produced
by IrisKing.
IIIT-D CLI database3 [45, 46] is provided by Image Analysis and Bio-
metrics Lab of the IIIT, Delhi. Iris images were captured by using two iris
sensors: the Cogent CIS 202 dual iris sensor and the VistaFA2E single iris
sensor.
The Notre Dame Iris Cosmetic Contact Lenses dataset4 [47], is provided
by the Computer Vision Research Laboratory (CVRL) of the university
of Notre Dame. This database contains iris images acquired by using an
LG4000, an LG4100 and an IrisGuard AD100 iris sensor.
1.4.2 Experiments on natural images
In order to take into account a wide range of scenarios that might
occur in real-world forensic applications, our camera identiﬁcation tests
are performed under various hypotheses:
 Perfect knowledge: there is a ﬁnite set of camera models (for
example the 26 models of the Dresden Image Database) and we have
1http://atvs.ii.uam.es/ﬁr_db.html
2CASIA Iris Image Database, http://biometrics.idealtest.org/
3http://www.iab-rubric.org/resources.html
4https://sites.google.com/a/nd.edu/public-cvrl/data-sets
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(a) LG EOU3000 (b) IKEMB 100 (c) Irispass-h (d) CASIA IrisCamV2
(e) Vista Scanner (f) Cogent Scanner (g) LG4000 (h) AD100
Figure 1.2. Samples of iris images coming from diﬀerent sensors of our
dataset.
full knowledge about each of them. In practice, for each model we
have a number of training images large enough to carry out reliable
estimates of all the features of interest. Therefore, we can use a
multiclass-SVM and will be able to compute a full confusion matrix.
 Limited knowledge: we have full knowledge on the target model,
but know nothing about the number and features of other models.
Practically, we have a large number of training images, classiﬁed as
either belonging to the target model or another (unknown) model.
Here, we can use only a one-class SVM, and will evaluate performance
in terms of precision and recall.
 Zero knowledge: in this case we have no prior information on the
number and features of camera models involved. There are only
a large number of images, each with the associated feature. In this
case, one can only hope to retrieve other images taken from the same
model, which may help for subsequent investigations. Therefore, we
will ﬁnd the K nearest neighbors (NNs) to the target, and report on
the precision@K, that is, the fraction of images that come from the
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same model as the target among the ﬁrst K retrieved NNs.
In the deﬁnition of the selected co-occurrence feature, we have left open
the choice of the high-pass ﬁlter used to compute image residuals. Indeed,
preliminary experiments show the performance to depend weakly on the
speciﬁc ﬁlter. In any case, we will provide results for those that performed
best in these tests, the s2_minmax_32 and s2_spam12hv, always with
all the color components. In addition, we will provide results also for
the s2_spam14hv ﬁlter, to allow comparison with the grayscale version
used in our previous work [12]. Instead, we will not consider the use of
denoising ﬁlters to compute residuals, since they increase signiﬁcantly the
computational complexity while not improving performance [12]. Finally,
we implemented also the features proposed in Celiktutan-2008 [31], Gloe-
2012 [34] and Xu-2012 [35]. Whenever possible, they are used as references
for performance comparison. The data-driven approaches are compared in
a dedicated section of perfect knowledge scenario while are not suitable for
others where a full labeled dataset is not available.
1.4.2.1 Perfect knowledge case
Here, we assume to have a ﬁnite number of camera models, with an
adequate number of training images for each model. Therefore, we train
a multiclass-SVM with linear kernel, using 100 images for each camera
model as training set, while all other images are used to test performance.
When multiple devices are available for a single model, which holds in the
majority of cases, all training images come from the same device, and no
test images from the same device are used. Otherwise, training and test
images come necessarily from the same device. We run this procedure
20 times, choosing each time at random the devices used for training.
Eventually, results are averaged on all runs.
Results are reported in Table 1.3. The upper part of the table is for
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Feature length accuracy acc. w/crop
Celiktutan-2008 592 89.64 53.08
Gloe-2012 82 92.51 65.85
Xu-2012 354 98.15 94.59
s3_spam14hv (grayscale) 338 96.92 93.38
s3_spam14hv (color) 1878 97.21 93.85
s2_spam12hv (color) 1878 98.52 96.26
s2_minmax32 (color) 1875 98.72 95.70
s2_minmax32 (color) 1000 98.56 96.27
s2_minmax32 (color) 500 98.47 96.14
Table 1.3. Performance of various descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database for whole images and for 512×512 crops.
reference methods, while the lower part concerns various versions of the
features based on co-occurrences. The second column reports the feature
length, while accuracy results are reported in column 3. All co-occurrence
features perform very well, with the s2_minmax32 on all color bands,
reaching almost 99% accuracy. Diﬀerences, however, are quite limited,
speaking in favor of the approach independently of implementation de-
tails. Even the simpler grayscale feature (the best in [12]) grants a 97%
accuracy. The best feature keeps working very well even after applying
feature selection, with an algorithm based on Fisher score [48], and reduc-
ing the number of components to 1000 and 500 (last two rows of Table
1.3). It must be said that also some reference methods provide very good
results, in particular Xu-2012.
In Table 1.3 we also report results computed on small crops taken from
the images, i.e., 512×512 pixel sections which account for less than 5% of
the whole image, on average. The co-occurrence features keep being highly
reliable, with a performance loss of 2-3 percent points, while for all refer-
ence features the performance impairs more signiﬁcantly, and dramatically
so for Celiktutan-2008 and Gloe-2012.
Table 1.4 provides the full confusion matrix for the s2_minmax_32
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feature. In the vast majority of cases the performance is perfect or near-
perfect. Let us focus on the exceptions. There is a clear problem with
some Sony models (DSC-H50 and DSC-W170): presumably, coming from
the same manufacturer, they use the very same in-camera processing suite.
The same considerations hold for the Canon Ixus55 and Ixus70, where,
however, the problem is much more serious. Another critical case is the
Nikon D200, which has been found relatively hard to identify also in other
investigations, including [34], which raises interest on the in-camera pro-
cesses it adopts.
In Table 1.5 we perform identiﬁcation using JPEG compressed images.
Indeed, uncompressed images are more the exception than the rule in the
real world. Very often, images are JPEG compressed before being used,
e.g., posted on a website or circulated on a social network. Therefore, it
makes sense to repeat the identiﬁcation experiment including compression,
taking advantage of the fact that the compression quality factor (QF) can
be easily estimated from the image itself. We therefore JPEG compress
the whole dataset at the same QF, choosing QF=90, 75 and 60 to consider
compression at various qualities, and repeat the very same identiﬁcation
experiment described before. As with the cropped images, we observe a
very graceful degradation of performance as the QF decreases, with an
accuracy close to 90% even at QF=60, for the best co-occurrence feature.
Again, reference features present a sharper impairment of performance,
and some of them are clearly unreliable with compressed images.
It is worth emphasizing again that in the above experiment the classi-
ﬁer is trained on images that are all JPEG compressed with the same QF
as the target. Therefore, no information is provided on the robustness of
features, but only on their versatility. On the other hand, robustness is cer-
tainly a desirable property, worth investigating. To this end we carried out
a further experiment in which the target image is either compressed, at var-
ious quality factors QF, or resized, at various scales s, while the classiﬁer is
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accuracy
Feature length uncomp. QF = 90 QF = 75 QF = 60
Celiktutan-2008 592 89.64 83.15 71.23 63.87
Gloe-2012 82 92.51 79.63 74.31 68.48
Xu-2012 354 98.15 94.85 88.91 82.90
s3_spam14hv (grayscale) 338 96.92 94.63 91.18 85.98
s3_spam14hv (color) 1868 97.21 95.84 93.06 88.22
s2_spam12hv (color) 1878 98.52 96.86 93.20 87.92
s2_minmax32 (color) 1875 98.72 97.34 94.38 89.25
s2_minmax32 (color) 1000 98.56 97.33 93.56 87.69
s2_minmax32 (color) 500 98.47 96.89 91.42 83.64
Table 1.5. Performance of various descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database for uncompressed and JPEG compressed images at various QFs.
trained on the full quality images. The results, reported in Table 1.6, leave
little room for interpretation. As soon as a mild compression (QF=90) or a
moderate resizing (scale=90%) are applied the performance drops dramat-
ically, becoming close to random guessing when more intense processing is
applied. Such a behavior can be easily explained for co-occurrence based
features, because they analyze micro-patterns in the image residual, which
are certainly altered by compression and resampling. Even so, these feature
show a higher (although always low) robustness w.r.t. most references.
1.4.2.2 Limited knowledge case
In the perfect knowledge case considered before a small universe of
models is postulated. However, in the real world, a very large and steadily
growing number of models is available. Accounting for all of them might be
diﬃcult, and certainly involves the managing of a very large image dataset
with the corresponding storage and computational complexity problems.
If also various forms of common processing are considered, the problem
becomes soon unmanageable. Moreover, adding new models, requires in-
tense work to update the classiﬁer. Besides these practical problems, the
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accuracy
Feature length original QF=90 QF=60 s=90 s=50
Celiktutan-2008 592 89.64 25.88 11.27 35.43 6.54
Gloe-2012 82 92.51 27.85 18.80 17.15 6.72
Xu-2012 354 98.15 35.86 12.40 39.39 9.31
s3_spam14hv (grayscale) 338 96.92 24.42 10.48 39.85 8.21
s3_spam14hv (color) 1868 97.21 33.75 12.68 53.09 10.58
s2_spam12hv (color) 1878 98.52 34.96 16.26 43.07 12.36
s2_minmax32 (color) 1875 98.72 40.48 14.06 40.76 12.23
Table 1.6. Robustness of various descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database w.r.t. compression and resizing.
multiclass approach, very appealing with a small number of classes, tends
to become less and less reliable as the number of classes grows. In addi-
tion, forcing the target image to be associated with one of the available
models gives rise to errors when the image comes instead from a diﬀerent
source. This is potentially dangerous, and plain unacceptable in many
forensic applications.
Therefore, it makes full sense to consider an alternative scenario in
which the prior knowledge is limited to just one camera model, and we
test the H1 hypothesis that the target image ﬁts such a model against
the null hypothesis, H0, that it does not. Indeed, this approach was also
explored in [34] in a similar setting. To gain insight into the importance
of this case, consider an investigator looking in a large dataset for all the
photos taken by the camera of a person of interests. By carrying out
one-class model veriﬁcation, most of (possibly all) the photos taken by
the camera model of interest can be readily singled out, restricting and
eventually speeding-up the search.
In our experiment, for each camera model of the Dresden Image Database
we trained a one-class SVM using 100 training images coming from cam-
eras of that model. All remaining images, both from the same model and
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precision recall accuracy
original image 84.50 68.76 98.46
512×512 crop 76.10 67.60 97.99
JPEG QF=75 62.45 53.32 96.03
Table 1.7. Performance in the limited knowledge case for the s2 minmax32
(color) feature.
from other models, are then used as test set. Relevant parameters are
kept ﬁxed for all models. Results are reported in Table 1.7, only for the
best feature, in terms of accuracy, precision and recall, as usual for these
kinds of decision problems. They are computed for each camera model,
and eventually averaged on all of them.
Working on uncropped and uncompressed images, precision and recall
are pretty good but certainly not perfect, with over 30% of the images of
interest that go undetected, and about a 15% of false positives. To gain
insight on this latter result, however, consider that our test set is highly
unbalanced, with most images taken by cameras of other models. In these
conditions, having only 15% of false positives is actually quite remarkable.
This is also reﬂected by the very high overall accuracy. Instead, a 30%
of misses might be a problem in some cases. Of course, depending on
the application of interest, one can modify the classiﬁcation threshold to
improve recall, for example, at the expense of precision. Turning to images
that are either cropped (to 512×512 pixels) or JPEG compressed (with QF
75) we observe (last two lines of the table) a slight decrease in performance
in the ﬁrst case, which becomes more signiﬁcant in the second one.
Table 1.8 reports results obtained in the same conditions as before
but using feature selection to reduce the components from 1875 to 500.
The performance does not change much when uncompressed images are
considered, either complete or cropped, with minor shifts between precision
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precision recall accuracy
original image 92.38 64.08 98.50
512×512 crop 73.23 73.32 98.06
JPEG QF=75 50.28 42.28 95.25
Table 1.8. Performance in the limited knowledge case for the s2 minmax32
(color) feature with feature selection (500 instead of 1875 components).
and recall. On the contrary, the eﬀect is signiﬁcant on JPEG compressed
images, with recall going below 50% and precision just above.
1.4.2.3 Zero knowledge case
We conclude this analysis by considering the situation in which we have
no clue on the camera used to take the photo of interest, but still want to
retrieve some useful information from the available large dataset of images.
In practice, the only action possible, based on the extracted feature, is to
retrieve other images that share a very similar feature, thus reducing the
search space to images presumably originated by cameras of the same
model, see ﬁgure 1. Clearly, this is not a model identiﬁcation problem
anymore, but this experiment sheds further light on the expressivity of the
selected feature.
In detail, we use the feature extracted from the available image as a
query, and look for the K nearest neighbors features in the dataset, using
a kd-tree based search algorithm. The performance is measured by the
precision@K, the percentage of hits over the ﬁrst K nearest neighbors,
considering as hits all images that belong to the same model as the query,
and averaging results over all images of the dataset used in turn as queries.
For the by now usual s2_minmax32 (color) feature we observe 81.00%
hits over the top 10 neighbors (K=10), which decreases to 70.68% for
K=20, 55.77% for K=50, and 44.16% for K=100 (1.9). Experiment on
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Query image model
Other models
Top-k nearest 
neighbors
Query Image
Figure 1.3. In the absence of prior knowledge, the co-occurrence extracted
from the target image can be used to query the dataset and retrieve photos
taken by the same camera model.
accuracy
Feature length MAP@10 MAP@20 MAP@50 MAP@100
Celiktutan-2008 592 45.50 35.88 26.42 21.17
Gloe-2012 82 36.78 29.39 22.43 18.32
Xu-2012 354 83.03 72.92 59.11 49.29
LBP256_color_f33 768 86.08 79.39 69.47 60.66
s3_spam14hv 338 84.09 75.37 62.59 51.93
s3_spam14hv(color) 1868 82.95 73.83 60.60 49.96
s2_spam12hv(color) 1878 85.17 76.32 63.01 51.85
s2_minmax32(color) 1875 81.00 70.68 55.77 44.16
Table 1.9. Mean average precision of various descriptors on the Dresden
Dataset for original images, in the zero knowledge scenario using a kd-tree
search algorithm.
compressed images are also reported in Fig.1.10. However limited, this
experiment shows clearly that the co-occurrence feature allows one to re-
trieve a large number of images taken from the same model as the query.
Of course, if the retrieved images have camera information attached with
them, this would again allow for an indirect identiﬁcation.
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accuracy
Feature length MAP@10 MAP@20 MAP@50 MAP@100
Celiktutan-2008 592 30.12 24.71 18.32 15.37
Gloe-2012 82 28.26 22.15 17.26 14.54
Xu-2012 354 55.34 42.21 29.91 23.59
LBP256_color_f33 768 48.74 37.72 27.33 21.75
s3_spam14hv 338 52.00 40.11 28.82 22.78
s3_spam14hv(color) 1868 52.96 40.92 29.48 23.47
s2_spam12hv(color) 1878 54.58 42.28 30.42 24.00
s2_minmax32(color) 1875 47.23 35.89 25.67 20.38
Table 1.10. Mean average precision of various descriptors on the Dresden
Dataset for JPEG compressed images at QF=75, in the zero knowledge
scenario using a kd-tree search algorithm.
1.4.2.4 Comparison with CNN-based feature
In this section we show the experiment performed on Dresden dataset in
perfect knowledge scenario with the use of CNN-based approach proposed.
We compare the results with the CNN in [15], that use a CNN followed
by an SVM pipeline for the camera model identiﬁcation. The comparison
is performed respect to the two state-of-the-art methods that performs
better: our proposed best feature s2_minmax32 working on color images,
and LBP based feature proposed by Xu [35]. Since, to train a CNN we need
both a train and a test set, only a perfect knowledge scenario is considered.
Is worth to note that our proposed network works on grayscale images
while all the comparison method exploit the full color images.
The comparison highlights that CNN-based methods outperform both
[12] than [35] approaches on small of size 64× 64,128× 128 and 256× 256,
patches. The best CNN method in classifying single image patches give
an overall accuracy over 93% even using only a 64 × 64 patch where the
performance of blind features decrease signiﬁcantly. Our proposed method
do not perform better than one in [15] but still gives comparable result
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Feature 64× 64 128× 128 256× 256 Full
Xu-2012 54.53 76.64 89.01 98.15
Bondi-2017 92.82   
Proposed co-occurence (color) 67.21 84.17 91.21 98.72
Proposed CNN 91.63 93.15 94.15 
Table 1.11. Performance of CNN-based descriptors on the Dresden Image
Database for diﬀerent size of crops.
even using a simpler net.
1.4.3 Experiments on iris sensor images
In this section we show that the model identiﬁcation approaches work
even on images taken in diﬀerent contest, such as images coming from
iris sensor. The importance of having a good camera model identiﬁcation
method for iris sensor is ﬁrst assessed in [49], where the interoperability
problem of iris sensor in the same system is explicitly decoupled in its
two basic components, namely, i) identifying sensor models, and ii) map-
ping images, or extracted features, from one sensor to the other. In [49] the
model identiﬁcation relies on some global features computed in the wavelet
domain, including selected means, variances and entropies. To take into
account technological constraints, the relatively small architecture pro-
posed is used, thus limiting both computational complexity and memory
requirements. Moreover, transfer learning is used to speed-up training and
reduce the training set size. Here we report only the experimental results
and the comparison made in the original paper [17].
Experiments performed on a large number of iris images coming from
diﬀerent databases prove that the proposed solution improve model iden-
tiﬁcation performance with respect to the reference methods. Moreover,
even if not reported is worth to note that keeping the structure of the iris
recognition system proposed in [49], the more reliable identiﬁcation step
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Figure 1.4. Iris images captured by diﬀerent sensors and at diﬀerent dis-
tances. The ﬁrst and the second row are iris images captured by diﬀerent
sensors. Images in the ﬁrst row are acquired by the Cogent dual iris sensor,
images in the second rows are acquired by the VistaFA2E sensor. In the ﬁrst
two rows, images of the same columns belong to the same subject.
impacts on the overall performance of the biometric recognition system,
so improving sensor interoperability.
1.4.3.1 Iris model identiﬁcation results
The iris model identiﬁcation approaches are evaluated by using all the
nine iris sensor models described in the previous Section. In particular, 900
samples were randomly selected from the database of each model, in order
to have a dataset with the same number of images per model, made up by
a total of 8100 iris images. 60% of this dataset was used as training set and
the remaining 40% for testing, taking care of selecting iris classes (subjects)
in the test set diﬀerent from those present in the training set. In order to
better train the CNN architecture proposed and the reference [15] a data
augmentation was performed, by extracting 9 patches from the center of
each image in the original training set, as illustrated in Fig. 1.5. Three
diﬀerent sizes of the patches have been considered, namely 256×256 pixels,
128×128 pixels and 64×64 pixels. Moreover, two diﬀerent training settings
have been considered for our proposal. In the ﬁrst one (training form
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Feature 64× 64 128× 128 256× 256 Full
Arora-2012    91.80
Xu-2012 91.73 93.81 97.21 99.04
Bondi-2017 94.14   
Proposed co-occurence (grayscale) 92.49 94.54 96.43 98.75
Proposed CNN (from scratch) 95.08 98.13 99.29 
Proposed CNN (ﬁnetuning) 97.18 98.57 99.35 
Table 1.12. Results of diﬀerent model identiﬁcation approaches on the test
set by varying the size of input images.
scratch) the CNN is trained anew on the training data; in the second one
(Dresden ﬁnetuning) a net pre-trained on images coming from the Dresden
database [44] was used. Results of the proposed CNN-based architectures
are reported in table 1.12 together with those obtainable by the approach
presented in [49], and by using a SVM classiﬁer with a linear kernel on
features extracted according to the approaches proposed in [35] and [16].
It is worth noting that while the features used by the approaches under
comparison have been extracted from the whole iris images, in case of
our CNN-base architectures, we considered crops of the images relative to
256 × 256 pixels, 128 × 128 pixels and 64 × 64 pixels. In order to have a
fairer comparison, we also report the results obtained by using the features
proposed in [35] and [16] extracted on crops of the same size. As regards
the approach proposed in [49], it must be observed that it cannot perform
well on crops coming from the original images. The CNN proposed by [15]
is shown only for patch of size 64× 64 as in the original paper.
As it is evident from table 1.12, the CNN-based approach that use
256×256 pixels crops perform better than the comparing approaches. The
improvement with respect to the approach presented in [49] is also statis-
tically signiﬁcant. When small crops are used for training, the Dresden
ﬁnetuning version of the CNN is able to outperform the training-from-
the-scratch one. In this case the improvement with respect to the other
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1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
Figure 1.5. Example of cropping iris images for data augumentation. In
this case we obtain nine 128x128 non-overlapping patches. Note that in case
of bigger crops the patches can overlap each other.
feature-based approaches that use images of the same size for training also
becomes signiﬁcant. Unlike the results obtained for natural images, here
the CNN proposed in [15], do not perform better. One of the reason could
be the size of dataset, that is smaller than before and is not suitable for
training such a bigger net.
Table 1.13 shows the confusion matrix relative to the best result ob-
tained by the proposed CNN-based architectures. Images coming from 6
models out of 9 are perfectly recognized, while the most part of errors
are due to misrecognitions between two very similar models coming from
the same vendor (LG4000 and LG 4100), so conﬁrming the validity of the
proposed approach.
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Chapter2
Blind source clustering
In blind source identiﬁcation scenario, there is no prior information on
the number and kind of possible devices involved. The analyst is given only
a number of images, with no useful metadata attached with them, which
might or might not be related with one another. In this scenario, classical
identiﬁcation is not viable anymore. Nonetheless, it may be important
to understand which images come from the same camera, and which are
not. Lacking any other clues, useful information may be extracted only
through image clustering. In fact, if the images have been taken by just a
few cameras, they can be clustered according to their common unknown
source. Besides linking photos with one another, clustering allows one
to estimate some important features of the unknown cameras, like their
PRNU, which can be used to identify new images coming from diﬀerent
repositories.
A few examples may provide some insight into the importance of this
task. Once gained access to a hard disk with child abuse images, investi-
gators may use blind clustering to estimate the number of devices used to
take the photos and their ﬁngerprints. These may allow one to trace back,
by further analyses, all authors of the photos. On a larger scale, law en-
37
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forcement agencies may download a large number of such images from the
net, and use blind clustering followed by ﬁngerprint estimation to build a
database of PRNU patterns to use in future investigations or even in court.
With reference to this last task, a growing number of papers pursue user
identiﬁcation or image-to-identity linking over social networks [50, 51, 52].
Correlation clustering (CC) is a recently proposed method for data par-
titioning. Given a suitable measure of data similarity (correlation), the
optimal partition is obtained by solving a constrained energy minimiza-
tion problem. Integer linear programming tools ensure fast computation.
Like all clustering algorithms, CC depends critically on the sensible set-
ting of some parameters. In order to overcome this need, we use consensus
clustering [53, 54] to extract a unique solution which aggregates a num-
ber of base CC clusterings. As a result of these steps, we obtain a ﬁrst
conservative partition, characterized by a very low probability of ﬁnding
unrelated residuals in the same cluster. Then we proceed with an ad hoc
reﬁnement algorithm which iteratively merges clusters. As the algorithm
proceeds, larger and larger clusters emerge, leading in turn to better esti-
mates of the corresponding PRNUs, and allowing the inclusion of further
small clusters and outliers, until a suitable stopping condition is met. We
already proposed the use of correlation clustering and cluster reﬁnement in
our recent work [55]. However, in that algorithm some key parameters had
to be set by the user based on preliminary analyses on a suitable training
set. This is a nuisance for the user and a source of impairment related to
estimation errors. In this thesis, I show my work presented in [56] that
modify substantially the algorithm of [55] by i) introducing the consen-
sus clustering step, and ii) adopting a new parameter-free probabilistic
merging criterion. By so doing, we obtain a fully unsupervised clustering
tool, where no parameter must be set by the user or estimated on external
training set.
In the rest of the chapter we will discuss state of the art work on
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Blind Source Clustering (Section II), provide the necessary background
and notation for the proposed method (Section III), describe the proposed
algorithm (Section IV), and ﬁnally we describe experiments and results
(Section V)
2.1 Related work
PRNU-based image clustering has necessarily a short history. To the
best of our knowledge, Bloy has been the ﬁrst researcher to deal with
this problem, proposing in [8] a modiﬁed version of the pairwise nearest
neighbor (PNN) algorithm [57]. In PNN, the source data are regarded as
single-point clusters. The distances between all pairs of clusters are com-
puted, then the closest pair is merged into a new cluster, represented by
its centroid, and the process goes on recursively, until a suitable stopping
condition is met. Clearly, as clustering proceeds, better and better PRNU
estimates become available. To speed up the process, Bloy introduced
some modiﬁcations to the original PNN, like picking at random couples
of clusters candidate for merging, or looking for all neighbors of a cluster
before proceeding with another one. Besides the need for the user to pro-
vide a sensible threshold to decide on merging, a major drawback of this
method is its computational burden. Several variants of this procedure
can be found in the literature, aimed at reducing its computational cost
or improving accuracy. Sometimes, a pre-processing step is introduced in
order to enhance the ﬁngerprint [58, 59]. In [60] a faster solution based
on hierarchical clustering is proposed, together with a criterion based on
a silhouette coeﬃcient [61], which combines measures of cohesion (inside
clusters) and separation (among clusters). The same solution, with minor
modiﬁcations, is followed in [62] for the purpose of smartphone clustering.
In [63], the original camera ﬁngerprints are replaced by their compressed
version. The time saved on PRNU-related computation, is used to re-
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store a non-random search phase, where the two clusters with the highest
correlation are selected as candidates at each iteration. Finally, in [64] a re-
ﬁnement step based on Hu's moment vector is applied in order to improve
performance. A diﬀerent approach is followed in [65], where PRNU-based
clustering is regarded as a graph partitioning problem. Each image is
considered as a node in a weighted undirected graph and the nodes are
partitioned into disjunct sets by means of spectral analysis [66]. Thanks
to the use of eﬃcient graph processing tools, this algorithm is much faster
than those based on PNN. On the down side, the performance depends
strongly on the random initialization, and the number of clusters must be
set in advance by the user. These problems are partially solved in [67]
by adopting the Normalized Cuts graph partitioning algorithm [68], which
guarantees a more stable performance and does not need the number of
clusters as input parameter. However, the stopping criterion is based on
the comparison of an aggregation coeﬃcient with a suitable threshold, a
critical input parameter itself. In [67] the optimal threshold value is esti-
mated by preliminary experiments on a training set, but no guarantee can
be given on the alignment of training and test sets.
Regardless of performance, a common undesirable trait of all these
algorithms is the need for the user to specify or estimate some critical pa-
rameters in advance, which may prevent their use in practical applications.
2.2 Background
In this Section we provide the background and notation necessary to
ensure the self-consistency of the paper and guarantee the full understand-
ing of the proposed method. After recalling some concepts and results on
PRNU-based identiﬁcation, we will brieﬂy describe correlation clustering,
and ﬁnally consensus clustering, with special reference to the recently pro-
posed [69] WEAC (weighted evidence accumulation clustering) algorithm.
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2.2.1 PRNU
The photo-response non uniformity (PRNU) is an intrinsic and stable
characteristic of each individual camera, caused by tiny imperfections in
the manufacturing process of the sensor. Following the simpliﬁed model
of [4, 70], the image observed at the camera output, I, can be written as
I = (1 +K)I(0) + Θ (2.1)
(products between images, unless otherwise stated, are pixel-wise) where
I(0) is the ideal noise-free image, K the camera PRNU, and Θ an additive
noise term which accounts for all types of disturbances. Typically, Ks  1
for all non-faulty pixels, s, of the image, hence the disturbance produced
by the PRNU is usually unnoticed. Still, since each image acquired by
a given camera contains traces of its PRNU pattern, this can be used for
various forensic applications, from source identiﬁcation [2, 71, 72] to forgery
detection and localization [4, 73, 74, 75]. The PRNU can be estimated by
extracting the noise-free image by means of a denoising ﬁlter f
Î(0) = f(I) (2.2)
and removing it from the acquired image, to obtain the so-called noise
residual
R = I − Î(0)
= IK + (I(0) − I)K + (I(0) − Î(0)) + Θ
= IK + Θ′ (2.3)
with the new noise term, Θ′, accounting also for denoising errors, I(0)−Î(0).
Given M images acquired by the camera of interest, one can perform a
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maximum-likelihood (ML) estimate of the PRNU as [4]
K̂ =
M∑
i=1
[
Ii∑M
i=1 I
2
i
]
Ri (2.4)
followed by a further step to remove non-unique artifacts originated by
other internal camera processes. Note that, to obtain a reliable estimate, a
large number of input images is required, because the PRNU component,
even in the most favourable conditions, is much weaker than the noise
component. Given an estimate of a camera PRNU, several tests can be
used to decide whether an image, I, comes from the same camera. The
most popular one is based on the correlation index, corr(R, IK̂), between
the image residual, R, and the scaled PRNU, where
corr(x, y) =
〈(x− x), (y − y)〉
‖x− x‖ · ‖y − y‖ (2.5)
〈x, y〉 denotes the inner product between x and y, x indicates the mean of
x, and ‖x‖ its Euclidean norm. Another common statistic is the peak-to-
correlation energy ratio (PCE), computed in the Fourier domain, which is
more robust to image cropping.
In this paper, rather than the ML estimate, we will use the sample
mean
K˜ =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Ri (2.6)
and the related decision statistic corr(R, K˜). Moreover non-unique arti-
facts are removed from the beginning from each residual. By doing so,
both the PRNU estimates and the correlations can be computed without
reference to the original images and without post-processing, which entails
important algorithmic simpliﬁcations and, eventually, high computational
eﬃciency. On the other hand, the sample-mean estimate of the PRNU
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Figure 2.1. Correlation Clustering applied to a toy example. Left: initial
graph; links with positive[negative] weight are shown in blue[red]. Right: an
acceptable two-cluster partition; due to coherence constraints, a link with
negative weight (-1) is kept in the ﬁnal partition, and one with positive
weight (4) is cut.
is largely adopted in the literature and shown [76] to be equally eﬀective
than the ML estimate.
2.2.2 Correlation clustering
Clustering can be cast as a graph partitioning problem. Let G = (V,E)
be an undirected graph, where V is the set of nodes, to which the data
instances are associated, and E a set of edges, possibly incomplete, con-
necting couples of nodes. The goal of graph partitioning is to create several
disjoint clusters of nodes according to some suitable criterion. Therefore,
all edges linking nodes of diﬀerent clusters must be cut, while the others
may be kept. In correlation clustering [77], a weight wij is associated with
each edge e = (i, j), expressing the correlation between nodes i and j.
Although the precise meaning of correlation depends on the speciﬁc prob-
lem, a positive[negative] correlation indicates, in general, that the linked
nodes are desired to belong to the same[diﬀerent] cluster. Based on this
information, one may be tempted to cut all nodes with negative weights
and keep the remaining ones. This simplistic approach, however, gives rise
easily to incoherent solutions. In fact, two nodes can be linked through
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Figure 2.2. The ensemble clustering problem.
multiple paths of various lengths, and all such paths must be cut at some
points to ensure the two nodes actually belong to diﬀerent clusters. As an
example, for the simple graph shown in Fig.2.1 on the left, the two-cluster
solution shown on the right requires cutting a link with positive weight
and keeping a link with negative weight. Therefore, correlation clustering
formulates the graph partitioning problem as a constrained energy mini-
mization. Let xe be the binary indicator variable specifying whether edge
e is cut (xe = 1) or retained (xe = 0), and x ∈ {0, 1}|E| a generic conﬁgu-
ration of the edges. With each conﬁguration, an energy E (x) is associated,
deﬁned as the sum of the weights of all cut edges
E (x) =
∑
e
wexe (2.7)
In pursuing the minimization of this energy, however, the coherence con-
straints must be taken into account. If nodes i and j are to belong to
diﬀerent clusters (xij = 1), any other node k cannot be grouped simul-
taneously with both i and j (xik + xjk ≥ 1). These constraints may be
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expressed synthetically [77] as
xij − xjk − xik ≤ 0 ∀ i, j, k (2.8)
and only the conﬁgurations respecting these constraints, x ∈ Xc, corre-
spond to acceptable solutions. Eventually, the problem can be expressed
as
xCC = arg min
x∈Xc
E (x) = arg min
x∈Xc
∑
e∈E
wexe (2.9)
Note that, since the coherence constraints are linear, the optimal graph
partition can be found by resorting to Integer Linear Programming (ILP).
The problem however is NP-hard, and hence, for large graphs, ﬁnding the
exact solution may become exceedingly complex. Consequently, greedy
techniques are typically adopted [78], which provide slightly sub-optimal
solutions but in a much shorter time.
2.2.3 Consensus clustering
A major problem with data clustering is that results depend signiﬁ-
cantly on the selected algorithm and, even for a given algorithm, on some
critical parameters, like the number of clusters or some decision thresholds.
Therefore, by running multiple algorithms, or even just one algorithm with
diﬀerent parameters, one ends up with a number of alternative, and possi-
bly very diﬀerent, clusterings. However, this over-abundance of solutions,
if properly exploited, represents a precious source of information. The
goal of consensus clustering is to suitably combine all these clusterings to
provide a unique and more satisfactory solution, as shown pictorially in
Fig.2.2.
Let
R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} (2.10)
be the dataset under analysis, with n data points. A partition P i of the
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dataset is a collection of ni disjoint clusters of data
P i = {Ci1, Ci2, . . . , Cini} (2.11)
with Cij
⋂
Cik = ∅, ∀j 6= k, and
⋃ni
j=1C
i
j = R. By running one or more
clustering algorithms, with diﬀerent choices of the parameters, we obtain
M such partitions, or base clusterings,
P = {P 1, P 2, . . . , PM} (2.12)
which are jointly processed to extract eventually a single consensus clus-
tering P ∗. In the literature, several approaches have been proposed for
consensus clustering with a large number of speciﬁc algorithms [54, 79]. A
ﬁrst approach is to formulate ensemble clustering as a graph partitioning
problem, as originally done in Strehl [80] and then in [81], where the graph
formulation simultaneously models both instances and clusters of the en-
semble as vertices in a bipartite graph. Recently, a more robust algorithm
has been developed in [69] based on sparse graph representation and prob-
ability trajectory analysis. In [82], instead, the Weighted Spectral Cluster
Ensemble (WSCE) method is proposed where a new version of spectral
clustering is considered together with a speciﬁc solution for combining the
individual clustering results. A ﬂexible and computationally scalable ap-
proach is proposed in [83], where a Bayesian framework is developed for
simultaneous estimation of both the consensus clustering and the source-
speciﬁc clusterings. A further set of methods rely on pair-wise similarity,
and the Evidence Accumulation Clustering (EAC), proposed in [53], is
among the most popular methods following this approach. It is based on
a co-association matrix which counts how many times two objects occur
in the same cluster in the ensemble of multiple base clusterings. In the
following we will describe in more detail this method and its recently pro-
posed generalization [69] adopted in the proposed algorithm. Let P i(Rj)
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indicate the cluster associated with Rj under the i-th partition. We deﬁne
the co-occurrence similarity matrix Si associated with partition P i ∈ P
as the matrix with elements
Sij,k =
{
1 if P i(j) = P i(k)
0 otherwise
(2.13)
That is, entry (j, k) of the matrix is 1 if Rj and Rk belong to the same
cluster under P i, and 0 otherwise. We then build the association matrix
A by averaging the similarity matrices over all base clusterings
A =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Si (2.14)
Therefore Aj,k goes from 0, when data points Rj and Rk never belong to
the same cluster, to 1, when they always do. Based on this evidence,
collected over the whole set of base clusterings, one can apply a single-
linkage agglomerative clustering method [84] to obtain the ﬁnal consensus
clustering P ∗. Note that this latter algorithm needs in input the ﬁnal num-
ber of clusters n∗, which must be known a priori or estimated by other
means. Experimental evidence [53] shows that EAC (like other consensus
clustering algorithms) provides, typically, a signiﬁcant performance im-
provements over all base clusterings. Occasional errors may be originated
by outliers, base clusterings very diﬀerent from the others, which impair
the quality of the association matrix. To avoid such problems, we adopt
a recently proposed [69] generalization of EAC, the Weighted Evidence
Accumulation Clustering (WEAC) which computes the association matrix
using generic weights
A =
M∑
i=1
wiS
i (2.15)
with
∑M
i=1wi = 1. The weights are chosen so as to prevent outliers from
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aﬀecting signiﬁcantly the result. This is obtained by relying on the wisdom
of the crowd, a widespread concept in social and economic sciences [85]
by which the most popular opinions are also the most relevant. Each base
clustering is considered as an opinion and compared with all the other
clusterings through a suitable similarity measure, sim(P i, P j), to compute
a crowd agreement index
CAIi =
1
M − 1
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
sim(P i, P j) (2.16)
These indexes are then used to compute the ﬁnal weights as
wi =
CAIβi∑M
j=1 CAI
β
j
(2.17)
where the exponent β is used to further emphasize diﬀerences. Following
again [69] we set β = 2, and use the normalized mutual information as
similarity measure.
A ﬁnal problem is the choice of the ﬁnal number of clusters n∗. Al-
though several methods have been proposed in the literature [53, 86] we
will use a new heuristic, explained in next Section, which better ﬁts the
needs of our speciﬁc problem.
2.3 Two-step source clustering
Before describing the details of the proposed method we want to mo-
tivate our design choices in light of the peculiar features of PRNU-based
clustering, and of our goal to obtain a totally blind no-reference algorithm.
Our elementary data are the noise residuals, R1, . . . , Rn, and we cluster
them based on their similarity, measured, for residuals Ri and Rj , by the
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Figure 2.3. Distribution of cross-camera (red) and same-camera (green)
correlations. The correlations are computed among individual noise residu-
als.
Figure 2.4. Distribution of cross-camera (red) and same-camera (green)
correlations. The correlations are computed among individual noise residuals
and camera PRNUs estimated on 50 residuals.
correlation index
ρij = corr(Ri, Rj) (2.18)
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Residuals from the same device (same-camera) exhibit, on average, a larger
correlation than residuals from diﬀerent devices (cross-camera). However,
due to the strong noise component, the distributions of same-camera and
cross-camera correlations overlap to a large extent, as shown in Fig.2.3,
raising serious doubts on the chances of ever obtaining a reasonable result.
In our problem however, as clustering proceeds (correctly), more and more
same-camera residuals are aggregated, providing increasingly better PRNU
estimates. These, in turn, can be used to reliably select new residuals to
include in the cluster, giving rise to a virtuous circle. Fig.2.4 provides
evidence to support this reasoning. In fact, same-camera and cross-camera
correlations computed between individual residuals and 50-residual PRNU
estimates exhibit well separated distributions.
This preliminary analysis makes clear that clustering and estimation
should proceed hand in hand. In fact, this is exactly what happens with
some well-known clustering methods, like the PNN with its iterative clus-
ter merging. Yet, we follow a diﬀerent path, carrying out a preliminary
correlation clustering, with no estimate updating, and adopting the esti-
mate/merge alternation only in the ﬁnal reﬁnement phase. The reason is
that correlation clustering, through its constraints, takes into account all
relationships at once. The decision on whether to merge two data points
in the same cluster or keep them separate depends, heavily, also on the
correlation of both points with third parties. A good example is provided
again by Fig.2.1. Indeed, one might think of merging the rightmost node
with a close one because of their positive (+4) link. This merging, however,
must be ultimately rejected because of the negative links (-6 and -2) with
other nodes of the same cluster. Overall, a much wider information base
is taken into account than in pairwise processing, allowing one to avoid
unwise decisions with long-term eﬀects. Using WEAC on top of correla-
tion clustering allows us to exploit the wisdom of the crowd and improve
the performance of this initial step. In addition, it frees the user from the
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Figure 2.5. Block diagram of the proposed method. Block 1 computes
correlations among image residuals: the matrix of correlations is the main
data structure of the algorithm. Block 2 (correlation clustering) outputs
a diﬀerent base partition for each value of parameter α. Block 3 (consen-
sus clustering) outputs a diﬀerent consensus partition for each value of the
number of clusters. Block 4 selects the optimum partition Q∗ among these.
Block 5 (cluster reﬁnement) merges clusters until convergence.
need to set a critical parameter, α, described later on, moving a decisive
step towards a fully unsupervised algorithm.
Starting from relatively small, but highly reliable, initial clusters, we
run an ad hoc reﬁnement phase based on the estimate/merge alternation
mentioned before. To decide which clusters to merge at each step, suitable
maximum-likelihood ratio statistics are computed, based again on residual
correlations, and the same statistics provide the stopping condition of the
algorithm.
These processing phases are now described in detail in the following
subsections. summarized pictorially in Fig.2.5.
2.3.1 Pre-processing
As a preliminary step, we compute the noise residuals of all images
under analysis
R = g(I − f(I)) (2.19)
where f(·) indicates image denoising, and g(·) the processes used to remove
the mean and non-unique artifacts. In our implementation, denoising is
performed by means of the BM3D ﬁlter [87], which proved very eﬀective
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[13] for the purpose of PRNU estimation. Non-unique artifacts are removed
as suggested in [4], that is, by zero-meaning all columns and rows, and by
Wiener ﬁltering in the Fourier domain.
Afterwards, we compute and store the inner products between all cou-
ples of residuals
cij = 〈Ri, Rj〉 (2.20)
and the related correlation indexes
ρij =
cij√
cii
√
cjj
(2.21)
After this preliminary step, neither the original images nor the residuals
themselves will be used anymore, as all items of interest can be computed
based on the matrix of inner products. This will speed-up tremendously the
subsequent steps, and in fact, the pre-processing accounts for the largest
part of the overall computational complexity.
2.3.2 Correlation clustering of noise residuals
We run correlation clustering using a fully connected graph, where the
residuals are associated with the vertices, and the weights account for the
correlation between them. Following [55], we deﬁne the weights as
wij = ρij − α (2.22)
The constant α plays a crucial role in the algorithm, as it deﬁnes which
weights are positive and which are negative. Remember that a posi-
tive[negative] weight wij implies a tendency to merge[separate] residuals
Ri and Rj . Hence, α 0 implies no clustering at all, while α 0 leads to
a single cluster including all residuals. Contrary to intuition, setting α = 0
is not a good choice. To gain insight into this problem, let us assume, as
done in [4] and also in [55], that cross-camera correlations (hypothesis H0)
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have a zero-mean Gaussian distribution
ρ|H0 ∼ N(0, σ0) (2.23)
In this case, using α = 0, half the weights between cross-camera residuals
would be positive, leading to a large number of undesired mergings and,
very likely, to less clusters than cameras. In [55], to obviate this prob-
lem, after estimating the standard deviation σ0, we set α = 3σ0. This is
a rather conservative choice, by which cross-camera links have almost al-
ways a negative weight, Pr(w>0 |H0) ' 10−3, and the same happens also
for many same-camera links, due to the overlapping distributions, leading
to many more clusters than cameras. However, in this ﬁrst step of the
process, over-clustering is largely acceptable, since it will be corrected by
the subsequent reﬁnement step, which operates only through cluster merg-
ing. On the contrary, under-clustering, with the emergence of clusters with
cross-camera residuals, represents an unrecoverable error. In this work we
do not ﬁx α anymore. Instead, we perform CC with a large number of α
values, uniformly sampled in the range [σ0, 5σ0] with step 0.1σ0, and feed
the ensemble of all such base clusterings to WEAC, which extracts the
ﬁnal consensus clustering. Here, both cross-camera (hypothesis H0) and
same-camera (hypothesisH1) correlations are modeled through generalized
Gaussian distributions, and their parameters, including σ0, are estimated
through the expectation-maximization algorithm. Since the shape param-
eter β = 2 (Gaussian) turned out to be near-optimal, it was selected for
the sake of simplicity. Finally, given the weights, we perform Correlation
Clustering by the fast greedy algorithm described in [78], based on the
binary Markov Random Fields optimization of [88].
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2.3.3 Consensus clustering
Once obtained the set of base clusterings P = {P 1, P 2, . . . , PM}, we
run WEAC as described in [69] to obtain the consensus clustering Q. The
latter, however, depends also on the number of output clusters, l, that is
Ql = WEAC(P, l) (2.24)
This parameter can be known in advance, or else must be estimated itself
from the data, and several methods have been proposed in the literature
[53, 86] to this end. In our case, however, considering again the subsequent
reﬁnement step, these methods are not really suitable, because we are
not interested in the clustering that best explains the data but rather in
any compact conservative clustering that guarantees the absence of wrong
fusions. In other words, we are ready to accept false negatives (same-
camera residuals that are dispersed over several clusters), but want to
avoid false positive (cross-camera residuals included in the same cluster).
Therefore, based on experimental evidence, we devised a simple ad hoc
criterion.
Let us consider the sequence of consensus partitions {Q1, Q2, . . .} out-
put by WEAC as the number of output clusters, l, goes from 1 (single
cluster) to some suitable maximum, possibly, the number of data points.
As l increases, new clusters emerge through the splitting of existing clus-
ters. Initially, such splits separate cross-camera groups of residuals, or
same-camera groups with markedly diﬀerent features. In these cases, since
a large number of residuals are involved, the similarity between subsequent
partitions Ql−1 and Ql is relatively low. When all these compact groups
have been separated, further increases of the parameter correspond typi-
cally to the separation of just a few residuals from some existing cluster,
with little impact on partition similarity. Therefore we implement a sim-
ple test on similarity, and select the parameter l∗ as the smallest value of l
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beyond which partitions do not change appreciably anymore. In formulas,
let  be a small positive value, say,  = 10−2, and
s(l) = sim(Ql−1, Ql) (2.25)
Then l∗ is deﬁned by the conditions
s(l∗ − 1) < 1− , and s(l) > 1− ,∀l ≥ l∗ (2.26)
With this value, we obtain the desired consensus clustering Q∗.
2.3.4 Reﬁnement step
This is a key part of the proposed method. Relying on the hypothesis
that previous steps provided pure clusters, with reliable PRNU estimates,
the clusters are progressively merged while better and better PRNU esti-
mates emerge.
Given the consensus clustering Q∗ = {C1, C2, .., Cl∗}, we estimate the
camera PRNU associated with cluster Cp as the sample mean, K˜p, of its
members. If the cluster is large enough, the estimate is relatively unaﬀected
by noise, and the correlation between K˜p and a generic residual, Ri, gives
a clear indication on whether Ri is cross-camera (H0) or same-camera (H1)
with respect to K˜p. More formally, let
ρi = corr(K˜,Ri) (2.27)
indicate the correlation between a PRNU estimate and a residual, and
fCp(ρ|H0), and fCp(ρ|H1) (2.28)
be the probability density functions (pdf) of the PRNU-residual correlation
for cluster Cp under the hypotheses H0 and H1, respectively. Given such
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pfds, we also have the log-likelihoods of the two hypothesis for the same
residual Ri {
Lp(Ri|H0) = log fCp(ρi|H0)
Lp(Ri|H1) = log fCp(ρi|H1)
(2.29)
Therefore, assuming the residuals of a cluster to be independent of one
another, given H0 or H1, we can compute the log-likelihoods of the two
hypotheses with respect to Kp for a whole cluster Cq by summing their
individual log-likelihoods, obtaining eventually the decision statistic
Λpq =
∑
Ri∈Cq
[Lp(Ri|H1)− Lp(Ri|H0)] (2.30)
These statistics will guide our reﬁnement algorithm. To compute them,
we must estimate the same-camera and cross-camera distributions for each
cluster Cp. Towards this aim, we compute the correlation index between
Kp and all residual Ri /∈ Cp, and run the expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm assuming a generalized Gaussian distribution under both hy-
potheses. However, it may happen that all same-camera residuals have
been already collected in cluster Cp, in which case the EM could not work
properly. To obviate this problem we augment the set of same-camera
correlations through a leave-one-out approach. That is, we remove one of
the residuals, say Rj , from the cluster and compute a new estimate of the
cluster PRNU without Rj
K˜ ′p,j =
1
|Cp| − 1
∑
Ri 6=Rj∈Cp
Ri (2.31)
Although K˜ ′p,j does not coincide with K˜p, it is a good approximation of
it whenever |Cp| is not too small. At this point we can compute the
correlation
ρ′j = corr(K˜
′
p,j , Rj) (2.32)
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Algorithm 1 Clustering Reﬁnement
1: procedure C = Refinement({R}, {C})
2: T|C| = 0
3: do
4: changed = FALSE
5: Increase T|C|
6: L = {Cp : |Cp| > T|C|}
7: S = {Cp : |Cp| ≤ T|C|}
8: compute K˜p for all Cp ∈ L
9: compute Λpq for all Cp ∈ L and Cq ∈ S
10: while max(p,q) Λp,q > 0 do
11: changed = TRUE
12: (p∗, q∗) = arg max(p,q) Λp,q
13: Cs = merge(Cp∗ , Cq∗)
14: update L ,S
15: update Kp for all Cp ∈ L
16: update Λpq for all Cp ∈ L and Cq ∈ S
17: end while
18: while changed
19: end procedure
and repeat it for all Rj ∈ Cp, contributing a total of |Cp| new samples of
same-camera correlations. Note that all PRNU-residual correlations can
be computed based only on the matrix of inner products as
ρi = corr(K˜,Ri) = corr(
1
|Cp|
∑
Rj∈Cp
Rj , Ri)
=
∑
Rj∈Cp
cji√∑
Rj∈Cp
∑
Rk∈Cp
cjk
√
cii
(2.33)
Therefore, we do not really need PRNU estimates to compute correlations,
which makes reﬁnement a very fast process.
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We can now describe the iterative reﬁnement procedure, also with ref-
erence to the pseudo-code shown in Algorithm 1.
The generic step is characterized by a threshold, T|C|, which divides
the current clusters in two sets
L = {Cp : |Cp| > T|C|}, S = {Cp : |Cp| ≤ T|C|} (2.34)
namely, the sets of large and small clusters, L and S . Here, large and
small depend on T|C|, which is a running threshold (not a parameter),
raised progressively during iterations so as to merge ﬁrst the smallest clus-
ters and then proceed with larger ones.
At each iterations we try merging each small cluster with one of the
large clusters. With this aim, we compute the statistics Λpq, for each
Cp ∈ L and all Cq ∈ S , and sort them in descending order. If the largest
Λpq is positive, the corresponding clusters are merged, then, the statistics
for the newly formed cluster are recomputed, all lists are updated, and the
algorithm proceeds in the same way until all statistics become negative.
At this point T|C| increases, moving the boundary between large and small
clusters. That is, some large clusters move from L to S , and become
candidates to be merged with larger ones. Moreover, small clusters that
remain isolated in a given step may still be merged in later steps, as PRNU
estimates keep improving and statistics change. The algorithm stops when
a single cluster remains in L and no more merging is possible.
2.4 Experimental results
To validate the proposed method, we carried out a number of exper-
iments in a large variety of conditions, comparing performance with the
best state-of-the-art references. Besides using the original images as they
are output from the cameras, we consider also the more realistic case of
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images subject to compression and resizing, as customary on social net-
works. In the following subsections, we describe the datasets used for the
experiments, the performance metric, some implementation details, and
ﬁnally the experimental results.
2.4.1 Datasets
In order to guarantee full reproducibility of results we use the publicly
available Dresden Image Database [44] described in the previous chapter.
For our experiments, we selected 10 models (see Table 2.1), including
a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 5 devices per model. The original
images are relatively large, from 5 to 12 Mpixels, and uncompressed. Upon
uploading on Facebook they are resized and JPEG compressed with size
and quality factor depending also on a quality toggle selected by the user
[89]. In the low quality (LQ) modality, the size is about 1 Mpixel, and the
JPEG quality factor goes from 70 to 90.
We built a number of heterogeneous datasets to explore various situa-
tions, more precisely
Set A: models { I70, Z150, D200, µ, RCP };
Set B: models { M1063, S710, DCZ, L74w, NV15 };
Set C: all ten models.
For each dataset (say X) we consider three version, with one (X.1) two
(X.2) or all (X.max) devices per model, in order to explore the depen-
dence on the total number of devices in the set. Therefore, the largest set,
C.all, includes 39 devices. We designed the disjoint sets A and B because,
for some reference techniques, a few key parameters must be estimated
on a training set: some thresholds for Bloy2008, the threshold Th for
Amerini2014, and the α and β parameters for Marra2016. So, if set A is
under test, parameters are estimated on set B and viceversa. For set C we
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are forced to perform the estimation on models, or even individual devices,
already present in the dataset. Note that no training set is necessary for
the proposed method.
To these heterogeneous datasets we add all homogeneous datasets, in-
cluding all devices of a single camera model. This is an important and
challenging test, because residuals might contain model-related micropat-
terns, due to the internal image processing chain, which boost clustering
performance. In homogeneous datasets, such micropatterns coincide for
all devices and cannot be exploited.
2.4.2 Results
The proposed algorithm has been developed in Matlab under Linux. To
ensure full reproducibility of research, our software is freely available online
at www.grip.unina.it. Moreover, the Correlation Clustering source code is
available at www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/∼bagon/matlab.html, while the
WEAC software can be reached through the link https://arxiv.org/
abs/1405.1297. The reference methods have been implemented as de-
scribed in the original papers.
By using Matlab, we renounce some eﬃciency in favor of simpler devel-
opment and better readability. This also prevents an accurate assessment
of complexity. On the other hand, most of the computational burden is
associated with the unavoidable pre-processing phase. The denoising of N
images, and the computation of inner products between N(N − 1)/2 cou-
ples of residuals largely dominates the complexity. In fact, the remaining
processing tasks do not access the heavy original data anymore, and base
all their computations on the matrix of inner products. For our largest
dataset, actual clustering (including the generation of multiple CC parti-
tions) took a few dozens seconds, as opposed to about two hours for the
pre-processing phase.
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2.4.2.1 Performance metric
Performance is assessed based on the agreement between algorithm
clustering and ground truth clustering, measured by the popular Rand
Index [90]. Let us consider a set of n data points, and two alternative par-
titions P = {C1, C2, . . . , CN} and P ′ = {C ′1, C ′2, . . . , C ′N ′} of these points.
Then let us consider all
(
n
2
)
couples of points: the two partitions are in
good agreement if the majority of couples have the same treatment in the
two cases, namely, they are kept together (in the same cluster) in both P
and P ′, or are separated (put in diﬀerent clusters) in both P and P ′. To
measure agreement the following counters are kept:
 a1: couples falling in the same cluster in both partitions;
 a2: couples falling in diﬀerent clusters in both partitions;
 d1: couples falling in the same cluster in P and in diﬀerent clusters
in P ′;
 d2: couples falling in diﬀerent clusters in P and in the same cluster
in P ′.
Based on these agreement (a1 and a2) and disagreement (d1 and d2) coun-
ters, the Rand Index is deﬁned as
RI =
a1 + a2
a1 + a2 + d1 + d2
= (a1 + a2)/
(
n
2
)
(2.35)
This index goes from 0 (total disagreement) to 1 (perfect agreement).
However, the average Rand Index for two random partitions RI is a non-
zero number which depends deterministically on the cluster cardinalities.
To get rid of this bias, we resort to the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) [91],
deﬁned as
ARI = (RI −RI)/(1−RI) (2.36)
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The ARI decreases quite fast as the clustering under test departs from the
ground truth, therefore, values close to 1 indicate a near-perfect agreement.
Imperfect but informative clusterings have a positive ARI, while values
close to zero or negative indicate serious issues.
2.4.2.2 Results on original images
Table 2.2 shows experimental results for the selected datasets. Together
with the proposed method, we consider some reference methods proposed
in latest years (see Section II), shortnamed Bloy2008 [8], Fahmy2015 [64],
Amerini2014 [67], and Marra2016 [55]. In addition, as a further reference,
we show the results provided by the oracle versions of Ncut clustering
[68] and Correlation Clustering [77], with parameters set a posteriori so
as to maximize performance. Therefore, such results upper bound the
performance achievable by these state-of-the-art clustering methods. We
also show results for the recently proposed [82] weighted spectral cluster
ensemble (WSCE) algorithm, with the number of clusters set to the true
number of devices (true-k) assumed known. For each dataset, the best
result (excluding oracles) is highlighted in blue.
The proposed method provides the best performance on all datasets,
sometimes with a wide margin w.r.t. the second best. As an example,
on the largest dataset, C.max, the proposed method has an ARI of 0.821
as opposed to the 0.686 of Marra2016, the second best. In addition, it
performs always better than both oracles and WSCE, with the only ex-
ception of dataset A.max where CC oracle is slightly better. These results
fully support our approach. In particular, the consistent performance gain
w.r.t. CC oracle underlines the importance of the reﬁnement phase, which
exploits the gradually improving PRNU estimates to make some critical
decisions. On the other hand, the improvements w.r.t. Marra2016 speak
in favor of other innovative design choices made in this work, notably, the
use of consensus clustering, and the adoption of a model-based decision
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statistic. It is worth reminding that, contrary to most reference tech-
niques, the proposed algorithm does not need user-deﬁned parameters nor
estimates them on external training sets. As expected, the performance
generally impairs, although not monotonically, as the number of devices in
the dataset increases. Nonetheless, even on the 39-device C.max, the pro-
posed method provides a very accurate clustering. Table 2.3 shows exper-
imental results for the homogeneous datasets, comprising several devices
of the same model. Contrary to our expectation, there is no performance
impairment, on the average, with results that are basically aligned with
those observed for the smallest heterogeneous datasets. Instead, the de-
pendence on the number of devices is fully conﬁrmed. The performance is
very good for datasets with just 2 or 3 devices, with Ncut oracle providing
always perfect clustering, while it impairs for 5-device datasets. A nega-
tive peak is observed for the Casio EX-Z150 model, due to some artifacts
in the PRNU, already noticed in [92] and [76]. On these homogeneous
datasets the proposed method is not always the best, but keeps providing
the best average performance, with a signiﬁcant lead over the second best,
Marra2016. Again, its performance is slightly better than both oracles and
WSCE.
2.4.2.3 Results on images uploaded from Facebook
With Table 2.4 we begin investigating the behavior of the proposed and
reference methods in the presence of image impairments. To this end, all
images have been uploaded on Facebook, selecting the high quality (HQ)
modality, and then downloaded again. Facebook automatically resizes and
compresses the images, but the HQ option guarantees that only minor im-
pairments are present. Even so, by comparing results with those of Table
2.2, a signiﬁcant performance impairment is observed for all methods, with
a loss of 0.3 points on the average. Some methods seem to suﬀer more than
others the lower image quality, notably, Fahmy2015 and Amerini2014, to-
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gether with the Ncut oracle, and especially WSCE. This latter method
is probably penalized by the constraint on the number of clusters which,
with very noisy data, leads to highly impure clusters. The CC oracle, to-
gether with the CC-based methods, Marra2016 and the current proposal,
show smaller losses, suggesting this graph partitioning approach to be more
conservative than Ncut. The proposed method keeps being the best per-
former on 7 datasets out of 9, losing to Marra2016 in two cases. When
the low quality option is used, Table 2.5, the single-image PRNU estimate
represented by image residuals becomes quite unreliable and, accordingly,
the performance decreases drastically, to the point that the majority of
methods become basically useless. Also the proposed method suﬀers from
such low quality inputs. It keeps being the best on 7 out of 9 datasets,
but the performance impairs signiﬁcantly, and the corresponding cluster-
ings, though meaningful (positive ARI) are not much reliable. Arguably, in
such conditions, one cannot rely only on the PRNU to make decisions, and
further information should be collected to complement the image residuals.
2.4.2.4 Alternative consensus clustering tools
In the proposed method, we use a speciﬁc consensus clustering algo-
rithm, WEAC, but many more have been proposed in the literature [54].
Testing all such methods is out of the scope of this work, but we tried
to replace WEAC with the hybrid bipartite graph formulation (HBGF)
proposed in [81], which ﬁts nicely in the whole algorithm, and whose code
is published online by the authors. The results, summarized in Table 2.6,
show WEAC to be clearly preferable, and especially more robust than
HBGF, with a strong performance gain especially on the larger datasets.
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original images facebook HQ
Set WEAC HBGF WEAC HBGF
A.1 0.916 0.397 0.723 0.602
A.2 0.852 0.665 0.592 0.541
A.max 0.729 0.283 0.532 0.471
B.1 0.915 0.677 0.847 0.791
B.2 0.836 0.786 0.718 0.660
B.max 0.881 0.822 0.644 0.436
C.1 0.865 0.532 0.646 0.378
C.2 0.956 0.807 0.485 0.537
C.max 0.821 0.347 0.601 0.386
Table 2.6. Comparison among ensemble clustering tools.
2.4.2.5 Visual inspection
To gain a deeper insight on the algorithms' behavior, Fig.2.6 and
Fig.2.7 provides a graphical representation of some sample results, as al-
ready done in [67]. To save space, we show results only for set B.1, with
both original images (Fig.2.6) and Facebook high-quality images (Fig.2.7).
Each bar-graph shows (up to 18) clusters retrieved by the methods under
comparison: Bloy2008, Amerini2014, Fahmy2015, Marra2016, proposed.
The total number of retrieved clusters and the ARI measure are shown
top-right. Each bar may show diﬀerent colors, proportional to the num-
ber of cameras in the cluster that come from each of the ﬁve devices.
The legend on the bottom shows, for each device, the associated color,
the corresponding camera model, and number of images in the dataset.
With both original and facebook datasets, the proposed method provides
large and pure clusters for all cameras. Using a small set (5 devices) al-
lows one to gain full insight on performance, a diﬃcult task when many
more clusters are involved. Marra2016 and the proposed method provide
the best results, as already clear from the ARI ﬁgures. In both cases,
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Figure 2.6. Graphical representation of clustering results on the B.1 dataset
with original images.
all detected clusters are pure or almost pure and there are large clusters
associated with each camera which allow a reliable estimation of the corre-
sponding PRNU pattern. The only wrong decisions concern the separation
of a few small clusters from the main ones. This happens for the Kodak
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Figure 2.7. Graphical representation of clustering results on the B.1 dataset
with HQ facebook images.
and the Praktica devices, with Marra2016, and only for the Kodak with
the proposed method. On the contrary, all other methods generate some
mixed clusters, which lead to inaccurate estimates of the PRNU pattern.
Moreover, Fahmy2015 is aﬀected by a strong cluster fragmentation, while
2.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 73
Amerini2014 produces a large number of singletons and very small clusters.
The performance impairs signiﬁcantly for all methods when the images are
downloaded from Facebook. Even Marra2016 generates only 4 large clus-
ters, now, with images of the Nikon camera dispersed over many small
clusters. In this case, despite the impairment, the proposed method pro-
vides clearly the best result, with four near-perfect clusters and the other
ones, two of which relatively large, accounting mostly for the Nikon images.

Chapter3
Forgery localization in a blind
scenario
The wide diﬀusion of powerful image editing tools has made image ma-
nipulation very easy. This impacts on many ﬁelds of life, and is especially
dangerous in the forensic ﬁeld, where images may be used as crucial evi-
dence in court. Therefore, in the last decade, digital image forensics has
grown tremendously, and new methodologies have been developed to track
an image source and determine its integrity. In particular, the interest has
focused on passive techniques, which detect traces of manipulations from
the analysis of the image itself, with no need of collaboration on the part
of the user.
Some of the most successful camera-based methods rely on the PRNU.
Its use was ﬁrst proposed in [2], both for source identiﬁcation and forgery
localization. In this section we focus on PRNU-based methods for forgery
detection and localization.
Several improvements have been proposed with respect to the basic
method of [2]. in [4] a predictor is estimated which adapts the statistical
75
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decision test locally to take into account image features, such as texture,
ﬂatness and intensity, thus reducing the probability of false alarms. In
[74], instead, the problem is recast in terms of Bayesian estimation, using a
Markov random ﬁeld (MRF) prior to model the strong spatial dependencies
and take decisions jointly rather than individually for each pixel. In [93]
and [75] the problem of small forgery detection is addressed, resorting to
image segmentation and guided ﬁltering to improve the decision statistics.
Further improvements have been recently proposed by considering the use
of discriminative random ﬁelds [94] or by introducing multiscale analysis
[95].
All these methods rely on the assumption that a large number of im-
ages are available, which are known to come from the camera of interest.
However, such an hypothesis is not reasonable in a real-world scenario.
Therefore, in this paper we propose and analyze a framework for image
forgery localization in a blind scenario [73]. We only assume to have a
certain number of images, whose origin, however, is unknown. Then we
estimate one or more PRNU's by means of a blind source clustering al-
gorithm and use them to establish the integrity of the image under test.
In the following Section we describe the PRNU-based framework for blind
forgery localization, while in Section 3 present experimental results of [96]
with reference to various clustering approaches [8, 67, 55].
3.1 Camera-based Forgery Localization Framework
In both camera identiﬁcation and forgery localization tasks, the PRNU
of the camera of interest is given in advance, or is accurately estimated
from a large number of images coming from the camera. However, in
many forensic scenarios, and especially in investigation, no information is
available on the origin of the images under analysis, neither the probe nor
the dataset. Often, however, it is reasonable to assume that the images
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Figure 3.1. A framework for PRNU-based forgery localization in a blind
scenario.
in the dataset come from just a few diﬀerent devices. With this assump-
tion, we can pursue PRNU-based forgery localization in a blind scenario,
following the framework shown in Fig.3.1 and already outlined in [73].
The proposed framework consists of four steps
1. Residual-based image clustering;
2. Cluster PRNU estimation;
3. Camera assignment;
4. Forgery localization.
The ﬁrst two steps allow us to group together images coming from the
same camera and to estimate their PRNU. Then, in step 3, the test image
is associated with one of the clusters (or possibly none) by a PRNU-based
correlation test. Finally, the tampered area of the test image is localized
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by detecting the absence of the selected PRNU. These steps are described
in more detail in the following.
3.1.1 Residual-based image clustering
To perform PRNU-based forgery localization one needs the true PRNU
of the camera. Otherwise, it can be estimated by averaging a large number
of images taken by the camera of interest. To this end, the ﬁrst step
of the proposed framework aims at grouping together all images of the
dataset coming from the same camera. Since these share the same PRNU,
they will exhibit a larger correlation than images coming from diﬀerent
cameras. However, before computing correlations, the high-level content
of the images, which represents an interference in this context, is removed
by high-pass ﬁltering, obtaining the so-called noise residuals.
Let R = R1, R2, . . . , RN be the set of all noise residuals in the dataset.
We want to partition this set in M distinct clusters, where the number
of clusters is not know a priori. Therefore, the output of this step is a
partition, P , of the dataset, namely:
P = {C1, C2, ..., CM} Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ ∀i 6= j,
M⋃
i=1
Ci = R (3.1)
In the literature, a number of PRNU-based clustering methods have been
proposed recently [56, 67, 8, 9], some of which will be considered in the
experiments. Ideally, we would like to obtain as many clusters as are the
source devices in the dataset, M = Mt, with Mt the number of devices,
and all of them pure, namely consisting only of images taken by the
same device. In practice, the estimated number of clusters may diﬀer
from the number of cameras and, even when they coincide, the clusters
may not be pure, comprising images coming from diﬀerent sources. In all
cases, the eﬀect is a loss of accuracy in PRNU estimation. When under-
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partitioning occurs,M < Mt, clusters are necessarily impure, comprising
also images coming from other cameras which act as additional noise in
the estimation. In case of over-partitioning, M > Mt, even pure clusters
may comprise only a fraction of all images taken by a camera, leading to
a less reliable estimate. The aforementioned eﬀects may both show up
in the same clustering experiment. Of course, all deviations from perfect
clustering tend to cause a loss of performance
3.1.2 Camera ﬁngerprint estimation
In the second step, each cluster is treated as pure, and used to esti-
mate both the PRNU and the predictor needed in the localization phase
[4]. Given Nm images in the m-th cluster, one can perform a maximum-
likelihood (ML) estimate of the PRNU as [4]
K̂m =
Nm∑
i=1
[
Ii∑Nm
i=1 I
2
i
]
Ri (3.2)
In alternative, one can use the simpler sample average
K̂m =
1
Nm
Nm∑
i=1
Ri (3.3)
which ensures very close performance to the ML case, provided Nm is large
enough. On the other hand, when the cluster is too small, both estimates
become quite unreliable because the noise residuals, Ri, have a very small
signal component overwhelmed by noise. Whatever the estimator, some
suitable steps follow to remove non-unique artifacts originated by other
camera processes.
Some clustering methods tend to generate a large number of small
clusters, even singletons, besides a few large ones. It makes sense to discard
such small clusters, due to the ensuing unreliable estimates. Therefore, we
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introduce a parameter, Nmin, left to the analyst to set, such that all clusters
with Nm < Nmin are automatically discarded, avoiding their involvement
in the forgery localization process.
Besides the PRNU itself, the localization algorithm proposed in[4]
needs a predictor, which establishes the expected value of the correlation
for a pristine image. Therefore, for each cluster, we must also estimate the
predictor parameters, say Θm. To this end, the cluster must be further di-
vided in two subsets, Cm = C
′
m∪C ′′m. The ﬁrst one, C ′m, is used to compute
an internal PRNU, to which images of the second set, C ′′m, are correlated.
The parameters of the predictor, Θm, are then designed to minimize the
error between the predicted and observed values of the correlation. Clearly,
this further partition of the cluster further stresses the need for it to be
large enough. To reduce this problem, we split clusters exactly in half for
this task. Note, however, that the ﬁnal estimate of the cluster PRNU can
be carried out from the whole set. Indeed, the test image is completely
alien to the cluster, and hence there is no reason to penalize the estimation
of the PRNU. In conclusion, the output of this step is the set of estimated
PRNUs and predictor parameters, {K̂m,Θm,m = 1, . . . ,M}.
3.1.3 Camera assignment
In this step we try to establish whether the probe image, Ip, is com-
patible with one of the estimated PRNU's, and which one. This decision
is based on the normalized correlation1
ρm = corr(Rp, Ip × K̂m) (3.4)
between the high-pass image residual, Rp, and each of the scaled ﬁnger-
prints.
1Here, and throughout this work, we assume the images to be perfectly aligned.
Otherwise, one can replace normalized correlation with Peak-to-Correlation Energy
(PCE) ratio [97], which works correctly also in the presence of image cropping.
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The probe image is assumed to come from the camera with the most
correlated PRNU
K̂max = arg max
m
corr(Rp, Ip × K̂m) (3.5)
which is therefore selected to perform forgery localization. However, it is
also possible that none of the cameras under analysis originated the probe
image, in which case all correlations should be small. To formalize this
problem, let us consider the two hypotheses
H0 : the probe image is alien to the dataset
H1 : the probe image comes from one of the dataset cameras
To design a statistical test we should know the distribution of ρ under
both hypotheses. This is not possible in our blind scenario, therefore we
resort to a Neyman-Pearson test, selecting a decision threshold, t, which
guarantees a suitably small false alarm probability PFA. Following [98], we
assume the normalized correlations to have a Gaussian distribution under
H0
ρ ∼ N(0, 1/HW ) (3.6)
where H and W are the image dimensions. Therefore
PFA = Pr(ρmax > t|H0) = 1− (1− Pr(ρm ≤ t|H0))M
= 1− (1−Q(t
√
HW ))M 'MQ(t
√
HW ) (3.7)
with the latter approximation holding for small M and Q(t
√
HW )  1.
By inverting the above relation the desired threshold is obtained.
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3.1.4 PRNU-based forgery localization
In the last step of the framework, a PRNU-based forgery localization
technique is applied. Several such methods have been proposed in the last
few years, and they all share the same basic idea. When the image is
tampered with, for example through the splicing of some alien material,
its PRNU is locally removed. Therefore, a sliding-window correlation test
is performed, and when the local correlation index falls below a given
threshold, a forgery is declared. Since the correlation may also depend
on the image content, the threshold must be adapted locally by using the
predictor with parameters Θmax estimated in step 2.
The output of this localization step is a binary decision mask that
highlights the pixels that are considered as tampered. Given such a mask,
and the corresponding ground truth mask, one can compute a number of
performance indicators. However, it is worth pointing out that the output
mask should be always analyzed by a human interpreter. In fact, real-life
image forgeries are performed with a purpose, and they possess a semantics
that is not easily captured by algorithms. The localization mask should
be therefore regarded as a diagnostic tool to support the expert decision.
3.2 Experimental results
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed PRNU-
based framework for blind forgery localization. Experiments are carried
out on six cameras: Canon EOS-10D, Canon EOS-450D, Canon Ixus 95IS,
Nikon D200, Nicon Coolpix S5100, Sony DSC S780. For each camera we
use 50 images as training set to perform the PRNU-based clustering and to
estimate the cluster PRNUs. Performance is assessed on 50 more images
per camera, diﬀerent from those of the training set. All images have the
same size of 768×1024 pixels, and are cropped from the same region of
the full-size images. To study forgery localization, we generate forged
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Set NCut-oracle PCE-PNN Marra2016
ARI TPR FPR ARI TPR FPR ARI TPR FPR
Original 0.872 84.31 1.21 0.839 75.74 0.00 0.960 94.79 0.26
JPEG (QF=90) 0.647 61.07 2.77 0.819 79.02 1.50 0.921 93.58 1.33
Table 3.1. Performance of clustering algorithms.
versions of the test images by pasting on them, at the center, a square
region of 128×128 or 256×256 sampled randomly from another image. In
addition, we repeat the experiments using JPEG compressed images with
a quality factor of 90. All the noise residuals are extracted by using the
BM3D denoising ﬁlter [87], and removing non-unique artifacts caused by
demosaicing and lens distortions as proposed in [4]
Localization results are given in terms of ROC curves, giving pixel-
wise probability of detection, PD, and probability of false alarm, PFA, as a
function of the decision threshold. As a synthetic measure, the area under
the ROC curve (AUC) is also computed. Before considering localization,
however, we study the performance of previous steps, to understand their
impact on the accuracy.
3.2.1 Image clustering and PRNU estimation
We implemented three clustering algorithms, based on Normalized
Cuts [67], on pairwise nearest neighbor (PNN) clustering [8, 73], and on
correlation clustering [55], called Marra2016. Note that Ncut requires a
threshold parameter to be estimated on a training set, so we consider here
an oracle version, selecting a posteriori the best parameter. For PCE-PNN
we used the threshold used by the authors in the original paper. Other
PRNU-based clustering methods [8, 58] are not considered here because
they have been shown in [67] and [55] to provide a generally worse perfor-
mance.
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Tab.3.1 shows results of clustering algorithms on both original and
JPEG compressed images in terms of adjusted rand index (ARI), true
positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR). Marra2016 provides
clearly the best results, even better than the oracle version of Ncut, with
ARI always very close to 1 (perfect clustering).
In Fig.3.2 we show a graphical representation of results. For uncom-
pressed images (left) Marra2016 provides near-perfect results, with just
a few extra clusters for the Sony camera, removed because too small
(Nm < Nmin). In this condition, almost all available images can be used
to estimate the PRNU's. The other methods show a higher fragmentation,
but clusters are large and pure enough to provide good estimations. Using
JPEG compressed images, performance impairs for all methods, but only
slightlly so for Marra2016. On the contrary PCE-PNN and Ncut-oracle
suﬀer more on this dataset, especially for the Nikon D200 images, that
will not allow a good PRNU estimate.
3.2.1.1 Image to cluster assignment
After clustering the images and estimating the cluster ﬁngerprints, the
probe image is correlated we all PRNU's. If the maximum correlation
exceeds the decision threshold, t, forgery localization is performed. To-
gether with the 600 test images coming from the selected cameras, we use
600 (negative) images taken from other sources, and cropped to the same
size. Tab.3.2 shows the detection performance for a threshold, t, set so
as to obtain a theoretical false alarm probability PFA = 10
−3. In detail,
the FPR is the fraction of negative images that pass the test, while the
TPR is the fraction of positive images (taken by one of the cameras in the
dataset) recognized as such. The FPR is always very small, compatible
with the theoretical level. The TPR is also quite large, but almost 6%
of the positives are rejected, a fraction that grows above 10% with JPEG
compressed images (almost 20% for PCE-PNN).
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Figure 3.2. Clustering results on original images (left) and JPEG com-
pressed images (right) for Ncut-oracle, PNN-PCE and Marra2016. Colors
refer to the devices (see legend) while bar height indicate number of images
in a cluster.
Set Original JPEG (Qf=90)
TPR FPR TPR FPR
Ncut-oracle 94.3% 0% 89.2% 0%
PCE-PNN 94.0% 0.3% 81.0% 0.7%
Marra2016 93.9% 0% 89.6% 1.5%
Table 3.2. Detection performance on original and JPEG compressed im-
ages.
Considering that Marra2016 provides near-perfect clustering, these er-
rors must be attributed to the intrinsic problems of PRNU estimation. Af-
ter correct detection, we could still have a wrong assignment, that is, the
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Figure 3.3. Forgery localization results on original (top) and JPEG com-
pressed images (down) with forgeries of 256×256 (left), and 128×128 pixels
(right).
probe image could be associated with a wrong camera/PRNU. However,
our experiments show this event to be extremely unlikely, with probabili-
ties lower than 0.1% in all cases and not reported in detail for the sake of
brevity.
3.2.1.2 Forgery localization
We conclude this analysis by studying forgery localization performance.
Localization is carried out by the algorithm proposed in [74], based on a
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Figure 3.4. Results for clustering-based and naive solutions on original
(left) and JPEG compressed images (right) with 256× 256 pixel forgeries.
MRF prior and on the predictor of [4]. Together with the ideal case where
the PRNU's are estimated from all available images, the case of real-world
imperfect clustering is also considered, with all methods discussed before.
Fig.3.3 shows the ROC curves for original (top) and JPEG compressed
images (down) with the two diﬀerent forgery sizes. With large forgeries on
uncompressed images results are very good. The AUC's are close to 0.9
with both ideal and Marra2016 clustering, and only slightly smaller with
the other clustering methods.
Surprisingly, Marra2016 provides even a small improvement with re-
spect to ideal clustering,maybe because the discarded images are outliers
that impact negatively on the PRNU estimation. As expected, all results
impair somewhat when considering smaller forgeries and JPEG compressed
images. However, the performance obtained with blind clustering keep be-
ing very close (equal for Marra2016) to those of ideal clustering. Finally,
we assess the performance when we renounce clustering altogether, com-
puting a single PRNU estimated by averaging all images in the dataset.
This naive approach makes sense, since the estimated PRNU will bear
traces of all camera ﬁngerprints, although attenuated due to the large
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number of unrelated images averaged together. Fig.3.4 shows a signiﬁcant
performance drop with respect to the clustering-based solution , both with
original and JPEG compressed images (only 256× 256 pixel forgeries, for
brevity) which fully supports our investigation.
Chapter4
Feature-based counter forensics
Images and videos are pervasive in all aspects of the modern world, and
are becoming ever more important also in forensics, where much evidence
in court are based on visual information recorded on digital media. As a
consequence, an arms race has long started, as in many other ﬁelds related
with forensics, between attackers, aiming at falsifying visual evidence for
malicious purposes, and defenders who try to reveal possible tampering.
Image counter-forensics is of great importance for both sides, as attackers
want to conceal traces of their manipulation, and defenders try to remain
one step ahead, by exposing themselves possible evasion tools. Among the
most frequent and dangerous forms of image manipulation is the insertion
of new objects in a photo or, diﬀering only under a semantic point of view,
the occlusion of existing objects. Fig.1 shows some examples of image
forgeries, crafted with an increasing level of skill on the part of the attacker.
Today's editing tools, like PhotoShop or GIMP, besides allowing the easy
production of a forgery, include a whole array of tools to conceal their
traces, like boundary smoothing, amounting to a basic form of counter-
forensics.
The recent trend in image forgery detection is towards the analysis of
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Figure 4.1. Examples of forged images: the copy-moved ﬂower in the left
image can be easily spotted by visual inspection; in the center image, the
keyboard has been hidden by pieces of background, but there is a suspect
change of shade; the frame replaced in the left image cannot be detected
without some statistical analysis tools.
image micro-patterns, that is, of the statistical behaviour of the image in
small local areas captured by synthetic features (local descriptors). Of-
ten, the analysis is carried out not on the original image, but on some
high-pass residual, obtained through suitable ﬁltering, since traces of tam-
pering may be found more easily once the low-pass image content has been
removed. Machine learning detectors based on local descriptors (LD) pro-
vide an extremely promising performance and, quite remarkably, the teams
ranking ﬁrst and second in the ﬁrst IEEE Image Forensics Challenge on
image forgery detection (http://ifc.recod.ic.unicamp.br) both used
techniques of this kind. Besides providing good results, techniques based
on local descriptors, hence on higher-order statistics, are more resilient to
counter-forensic attacks, since the relation between image and features is
typically non-invertible.
In this chapter, we propose and analyze some counter-forensic attacks
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to LD-based forgery detection techniques presented also in [99]. More
in detail, we consider a state-of-the-art detector based on the computa-
tion of a histogram of co-occurrences on the image residual [10] and a
simpler approach based on Local Binary Pattern (LBP) descriptor [32],
proposed originally for texture analysis. The classiﬁer is trained on a
suitable training set, comprising splicings (with no speciﬁc processing) of
various sizes, including small ones. Inspired by [100] we consider both a
perfect-knowledge scenario, in which the attacker has full knowledge of
the detector, and a limited-knowledge one, where no side information is
available. In both scenarios, the proposed techniques perform feature-
histogram restoration, with a constraint on image distortion. In our case,
however, gradient-descent algorithms cannot be used, and an ad hoc greedy
optimization algorithm is therefore proposed. Experimental analysis on a
suitable test set proves the eﬀectiveness of these attacks, with an obvious
performance gap in favor of the perfect-knowledge scenario.
4.1 Related Work
Counter-forensics is a relatively new topic in the context of image
forgery detection [5], especially if compared with more mature ﬁelds, like
biometrics, digital watermarking, steganography, network security, etc.
Kirchner and Böhme have been probably the ﬁrst researchers to deal with
image counter-forensics showing [101] how some rather simple attacks can
destroy traces of resampling and casting therefore serious doubts on the
eﬀectiveness of some image forensic schemes based on these features. Like-
wise, Stamm [102] showed that the quantization artifacts caused by JPEG
compression can be hidden by adding a dithering noise on the DCT co-
eﬃcients, restoring approximately the histogram of the original image.
Interestingly, it was later observed [103] that dithering introduces its own
artifacts, that other forensic tools can discover. This is a rather general
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phenomenon, observed also with reference to techniques based on camera
sensor noise where the attack [104] is countered by an ad hoc method [105]
which can be attacked in its turn [106]. Indeed, such two-party problems
should be handled through a game-theoretic approach, as proposed in some
recent papers [107, 108, 109].
The theoretical results found therein, however, hold only in very special
conditions, not met in most practical applications. Notice that changes on
isolated image samples or transform coeﬃcients impact on distortion in a
simple way, allowing for an easy enforcement of the distortion constraint.
When working on more elaborate features this is often not the case. A
relatively common approach to counter-forensics is histogram restoration.
Several typical image processing tasks, such as contrast-enhancement or
gamma correction, but also resampling and compression, leave traces in
the image histogram that can be exploited to detect the tampering. Of
course, by restoring the original histogram, detection becomes impossible.
A possible approach [110] consists in modifying iteratively the histogram,
through small changes in the image, making it as close as possible to the
histogram of a pristine image, and having care, at the same time, not to
degrade visibly the forged image. A similar technique has been subse-
quently proposed [111] and applied to attack a double-JPEG compression
detector. Other detectors tailored to speciﬁc features, like color ﬁlter array
(CFA) artefacts, camera sensor noise and JPEG compression traces, have
also been attacked [112, 113] by means of direct injection, using feature
decomposition to limit complexity. Notice that changes on isolated image
samples or transform coeﬃcients impact on distortion in a simple way, al-
lowing for an easy enforcement of the distortion constraint. When working
on more elaborate features this is often not the case.
As a matter of fact, the most promising forgery detectors proposed in
the recent literature [114, 115, 116, 9] exploit higher-order statistics, re-
sorting to local descriptors, features computed on a neighborhood of the
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target pixels and working also on a pre-ﬁltered high-pass version of the
image. Both choices cause the feature associated with a pixel to depend
on the mutual relationship among groups of pixels. A notable example
is the rich-model descriptors [10], used originally for steganalysis, and
found to be very eﬀective also for forgery detection [117] and localiza-
tion [40, 118, 119]. Since no hypotheses are made on the image tampering
process, machine learning detectors based on such features are typically
more general and robust than the previous generation. Moreover, with
such features, counter-forensics based on histogram restoration becomes
much more difucult. In fact, any change in the feature space impacts on a
whole group of pixels in the image space, hence on higher-order statistics,
and the relationship is typically non-linear, since quantization is part of
the feature generation process.
Statistical restoration has been long studied in steganalysis, with both
established theoretical results [120] and practical techniques [121]. In that
context, the higher-order restoration problem has been also considered by
Sarkar [122], for a detector based on second-order dependencies in the
DCT domain, using the earth-mover's distance (EMD) formulation, and
providing the optimum way of redistributing weights for restoration. Since
the problem has a high computational complexity, an heuristic algorithm
is proposed for actual implementation. To the best of our knowledge, the
only attempt to attack a LD-based image forgery detector is in a 2012
paper [123] where histogram restoration is performed in the feature space
to attack Shi's technique [114].
Since we focus, here, on machine learning methods, it is also worth con-
sidering adversarial machine learning (also known as adversarial pattern
recognition) where similar problems are encountered [124, 125], although
not related to image processing, in general, and forgery detection in par-
ticular. Especially relevant is the work of Biggio [100] dealing with the
detection of counterfeited pdf ﬁles, where a problem similar to histogram
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restoration is solved by a gradient descent method. However, rather than
aiming at a speciﬁc feature associated with a genuine item, a more con-
venient feature is synthesized and pursued by the proposed algorithm,
which lies in the acceptance region of the detector just past the decision
boundary. This expedient allows for a much faster solution of the problem,
although some constraints are necessary to guarantee that the synthetic
feature corresponds to a valid pdf ﬁle. An attack against a classiﬁer based
on Bag-of-Words has been recently used for image classiﬁcation [126], con-
sidering both sparse and dense features, showing that it is possible to
modiﬁy an image without aﬀecting its quality and fooling the classiﬁer.
The attack consists essentially in replacing a certain number of selected
patches with similar ones belonging to a large dictionary of candidates.
Finally, it is worth mentioning an experiment carried out by Nguyen et
al. [127], where a state-of-the-art convolutional neural network is induced
to classify as "lion", with 99.99% conﬁdence, a properly mastered white
noise ﬁeld, shading light on how much room remains for research in this
ﬁeld.
4.2 Forgery Detection Counter-Forensics
Let X ∈X be a pristine image, with X the image space, for example
{0, . . . , 255}N , forN -pixel gray-scale images with 8-bit precision, andX0 ∈
X its forged version. Though immaterial for our purposes, we assume
that the forgery has been carried out with due skill, and hence it goes
undetected at a visual inspection. However, we assume it is detected with
high probability by a suitable machine-learning method based on a local
descriptor of the image. More precisely, to classify a generic image X,
the detector extracts in sequence the following pieces of information (see
Fig.2)
 residual image R, obtained for example, but not necessarily, through
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a high-pass linear ﬁlter;
 local feature image F , including quantization and coding in the ex-
traction process;
 feature vector h = hist(F ), where hist is the histogram operator;
 estimated class Y c ∈ {−1,+1}, with −1 for pristine and +1 for
forged image.
Our former assumption on detector reliability translates, therefore, in the
detector decisions being with high probability Y c(X) = −1 and Y c(X0) =
+1. The attacker wants to process the forged image so as to a obtain a
modiﬁed image X∗ which evades the detector, while remaining very similar
to the original X0. We consider two alternative scenarios
1. limited knowledge (LK): the attacker knows only the feature extrac-
tion process, but does not know the classiﬁer nor the training set
used to build it;
2. perfect knowledge (PK): the attacker knows not only the feature
extraction procedure but also the classiﬁer or the training set or
both.
Depending on which of these scenarios holds, the attacker follows two
slightly diﬀerent strategies.
4.2.1 Limited knowledge
In the LK case, the attacker does not know for sure what the detec-
tor will decide for any given input but, lacking any further information,
and assuming the detector is generally reliable, works on the reasonable
hypothesis that it will classify X as pristine and X0 as forged. Given
this minimal information, a possible strategy is to replace X0 with a new
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Figure 4.2. Typical workﬂow of an LD-based machine learning detector.
Image X is ﬁltered to obtain its high-pass residual, R, based on which the
feature ﬁeld, F , is computed. Its histogram h is then fed to the classiﬁer.
image X∗ such that1 h(X∗) = h(X), as depicted symbolically in the left
part of Fig.3. Among the many modiﬁed images respecting this constraint,
X∗ will be the one most similar to X0 under a suitable image distortion
measure φ :X ×X → R. More formally
X∗ = arg min
Z∈X
φ(Z,X0), s.t. h(Z) = h(X) (4.1)
This formulation presents two major problems. First of all, although there
are many feature images with the same histogram, not all of them corre-
spond to valid input images. Depending on the feature extraction process,
some combination of values are simply non achievable. Moreover, ﬁnding
the set of images which respect the constraint of eq.4.1 is unfeasible in
practice, as it would require inverting the chain depicted in Fig.2, or else
analyzing a huge space of images.
However, since it is reasonable to expect that feature vectors close to
h(X) will have themselves a high probability of passing the test (see again
Fig.3), we can relax the constraint of eq.4.1, obtaining a more tractable
problem
Z∗ = arg min
Z∈X
φ(Z,X0), s.t. ψ(h(Z), h(X)) < Th (4.2)
1To avoid heavy notation, we use h(X), here, to mean h(F (X))
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where ψ : H ×H → R is a suitable distance deﬁned on the space of
histograms H , and Th a suitable threshold value. Alternatively, we can
recast the problem as
Z∗ = arg min
Z∈X
ψ(h(Z), h(X)), s.t. φ(Z,X0) < TX (4.3)
switching the roles of image and feature spaces.
In this latter formulation, the constraint is easily satisﬁed by sampling
the image space only in the appropriate region, e.g. a ball centered onX0 if
φ coincides with the L2 norm, or an hypercube if the L∞ norm is preferred.
Even so, the solution may still be unsatisfactory, that is, characterized by
a large distance in the feature space, and hence not passing the test. Even
assuming that X∗ is a satisfactory solution, the problem remains of how
to achieve it. A large number of algorithms can be used to obtain an
approximate solution through a suitable sampling schemes in the search
space, all characterized by exceedingly high complexity, however, for a
typical-sized image. To limit complexity, we propose an ad hoc heuristic,
described in subsection 3.4, where sampling is carried out in a space closer
to the decision, and hence the search path is more easily steered towards
the desired solution.
4.2.2 Perfect knowledge
Now, the attacker can rely on many more pieces of information, as
shown symbolically in the right part of Fig.3, where both the decision
boundary (that is the classiﬁer) and the labeled training samples are visi-
ble. Here we follow the approach of Biggio [100], with the obvious diﬀerence
that we cannot rely on a gradient descent algorithm. The image is hence
modiﬁed so that the feature vector travels towards the decision boundary
approximately along the orthogonal path. In principle, the updating could
stop as soon as the boundary is crossed but this would be fragile w.r.t.
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Figure 4.3. Limited knowledge (left) and perfect knowledge (right) strate-
gies: in the ﬁrst case, the attacker has no information on the detector and
aims at the histogram h(X) of the pristine image; in the second case, a
suitable synthetic histogram h∗ can be built and pursued.
possible changes in the detector. Therefore, we will consider a small safety
margin. The obvious advantage w.r.t. the LK case is that the path is
typically shorter, implying both a faster convergence and a lower distance
from X0.
If the detector is not known, but the labeled training set is, the al-
gorithm can point towards the closest point corresponding to a pristine
image, in which case, however, besides the slower convergence, there is no
guarantee to obtain the desired decision, since the training image itself
may be mis-classiﬁed.
4.2.3 Greedy sampling algorithm
We describe here the sampling algorithm used to ﬁnd an approximate
solution to the problem of eq.4.3. The solution is approximate both be-
cause the iterative procedure converges very slowly, calling for some early
stopping conditions before reaching the desired feature, and also because
its greedy nature implies that it can get trapped in some local minima.
In its basic form, the algorithm resembles the Iterated Cconditional Mode
(ICM) [128] and its variations.
The algorithm is initialized with the forged image X0. Then, in the
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generic i-th step, Xi is obtained by modifying only one pixel, call it the
target t, of the previous image, which is updated so as to maximize locally
the objective function. In formulas
Xi(p) =
{
arg minx(t) ψ(h(Z), h(X
i)) p = t
Xi−1(p) p 6= t (4.4)
This basic step is then repeated until convergence, through some suitable
sampling scheme of the image. In particular, it is advisable not to pro-
ceed in raster-scan modality to avoid drift eﬀects. Often a pseudo-random
scheme is considered, but in our case, given the feature extraction process,
we know in advance the footprint of a single-pixel change, so visit the im-
age on a regular grid, suitably large, and slide it by one pixel at each step.
Although the value of ψ(·, ·) is relatively simple to compute, because of the
limited footprint of any change, the overall complexity is still exceedingly
high. As a faster alternative, rather than minimizing the distance over
X(t), testing all possible values, we can select just one value at random
and check whether it reduces the distance, in which case it is accepted.
Better yet, when the feature extraction process is relatively simple, we can
work in a domain closer to the feature vector, either the residual image
or the local feature image, and select in advance only changes that are
very likely to reduce the feature distance, with a signiﬁcant reduction of
complexity.
We describe this idea by means of a running example. For the sake
of clarity, we select the very simple case of the LBP feature computed
over the image (not the residuals) without interpolation. However, with
suitable modiﬁcations, the same approach can be used in more complex
situations. Let us consider the image fragment depicted in Fig.4 (left) in
terms of digital numbers. For each point p, the LBP feature is computed
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Figure 4.4. A single step of the propose greedy procedure. The target t
is the center pixel of the image fragment (top-left). The corresponding LBP
string is 11010000, coded as 11 in the feature image (top-right). By increasing
the 5-th neighbor of t (bottom-left), the 5-th bit is ﬂipped, changing 11
(undesired) to 27 (desired). In the change footprint (blue, bottom-right):
together with the desired switch, there is also a switch from 31 to 17.
as
LBP(p) =
7∑
j=0
bj(p)2
j (4.5)
where
bj(p) =
{
0 X(p) ≤ X(ηj(p))
1 otherwise
(4.6)
and the ηj(p)'s are the 8-connected neighbors of p in raster scan order. By
applying these formulas on our example image, the string of bits associated
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with the target pixel t is b = 11010000 (we drop t from now on, for
notational simplicity), corresponding to F = 11. When considering pixel
t for updating, we inspect the frequency of occurrence of F , namely h(F ):
if it is already smaller than h∗(F ), the desired histogram, no updating
takes place. Otherwise, we inspect the features obtained by switching just
one bit of the string b, and keep the ﬁrst one (if any) which reduces the
histogram distance. To obtain a switch on the j-th bit, we only have
to modify the value of X(ηj(t)), to change the sign of the diﬀerence w.r.t.
X(t). Before accepting this change, however, we must check its suitability:
it must not increase the distance betweenXi andX0 beyond the threshold,
and it must actually reduce the histogram distance, which is not certain
because a single pixel alteration impacts on 9 LBP values (its footprint,
the blue square in the bottom-right feature image). To simplify this check,
we use the L1 norm for the feature distance. If all controls are passed, the
change is accepted. Although still cumbersome, this procedure is much
faster than that in the image domain, since most of the selected changes
turn out to be acceptable, especially at the beginning.
Needless to say, working on residuals adds further complexity, and in
any case the implementation is ad hoc, strictly related to the selected
feature, and is not granted to work in all cases.
4.3 Experimental results
In this Section we present the results of some preliminary experiments
that, although limited in scope, provide much insight into the potential
of the proposed method. We consider two LD-based machine learning
detectors, the ﬁrst one using LBP on the original image, called LBP256
in the following, and the second one computing 4-pixel co-occurrences on
the residuals of 3rd order liner ﬁlter, as proposed in the reference paper
[10], and called S3SPAM from now on. Both SVM detectors have been
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Figure 4.5. Main performance indicators on image 35 of the test set for
the PK (left) and LK (right) scenarios.
trained on a dataset of 800 images of size 384×512 pixels, 400 pristine and
400 with random square forgeries (hence, not realistic), of various sizes
and processing history. Then, 800 more images of similar characteristics
are used as test set. These detectors were tested preliminarily on the
dataset of the First Forensic Challenge, providing a score, deﬁned as the
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MaxSteps steps TPR PSNR / (min) Time
500 482 0.89 61.37 / (53.40) 300
1000 888 0.74 59.19 / (52.01) 629
1500 1196 0.47 57.81 / (50.43) 1001
2000 1367 0.23 57.36 / (50.35) 1298
2500 1451 0.11 56.90 / (49.40) 1555
3000 1490 0.05 56.79 / (49.40) 1650
∞ 1522 0.00 56.78 / (49.40) 1820
Table 4.1. Performance indicators for the S3SPAM-based detector, PK
scenario, averaged over 100 test images.
average probability of correct decision, of 0.86 and 0.91, respectively. On
our dataset, results were slightly worse, 0.80 and 0.89, with the detector
based on S3SPAM features keeping a clear lead over the simpler LBP-based
one. To test our counter-forensic methods we select in advance images that
are correctly recognized as forged by both detectors, and with the pristine
version recognized as pristine.
Before going to statistical analyses, however, in Fig.5, for one of such
images, we plot the main performance indicators as a function of the al-
gorithm progress. More precisely,we report on the x-axis the current step
of the algorithm, where each step corresponds to the visit of a target site
with possible local updating, and on the y-axis the current detector score
(left), image PSNR (middle), and CPU-time (right), for both the perfect
knowledge (top row) and limited knowledge (bottom row) scenarios. Con-
sider ﬁrst the perfect knowledge case. The detector score, related to the
distance from the decision boundary, is initially positive, as expected for
a forged image, but then drops very quickly (less than 1000 steps) below
zero, indicating that the detector is now tricked into classifying the image
as pristine. However, before claiming the attack as successful, we must
verify that it has left basically unaltered the image, without introducing
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visible artifacts. Indeed, the center plot fully supports this case, since a
PSNR in the order of 60 dB (for LBP) or 70 dB (for S3SPAM) corre-
sponds to a very high-quality image. Alternative image quality indexes,
SSIM, FSIM, not shown here, provide similar indications. Finally,a sig-
niﬁcant CPU-time is observed for the S3SPAM-based detector, due to the
need to re-classify the feature each time to compute the score and, not
last, to our current implementation in Matlab, certainly ineﬃcient.
In the limited-knowledge scenario things are much diﬀerent. The score
does not decrease monotonically anymore, because moves going towards
h(X) may occasionally increase the distance from the decision boundary.
In general, the convergence is much slower, and the score takes more than
3000 steps to become negative with the S3SPAM feature, and it never does
with LBP (the attack fails). These results may look surprising. With ref-
erence to Fig.3, they could be justiﬁed only if the line from h(X0) to h(X)
traveled almost parallel to the decision hyperplane. In fact, this is exactly
the case: with features living in a space with hundreds of dimensions, the
line orthogonal to the boundary can explain only a tiny fraction of the
distance between two points, and hence most of the updates are just use-
less. With so many updating steps, also the PSNR decreases, but remains
always above a safe 50 dB limit. As a positive side, complexity decreases
signiﬁcantly w.r.t. the PK case.
These remarks are conﬁrmed by experiments on the full dataset. In par-
ticular, the counter-forensic attack has been applied to 100 images chosen
as said before. Results are reported in Tables I to IV. We draw attention
only on a few remarkable results: ﬁrst of all, in the perfect knowledge
scenario, the attack has always success. The long time required for the
S3SPAM-based detector can be probably cut by 90% with a careful im-
plementation in a compiled language. Instead, in the limited knowledge
scenario, results are much worse, and the CPU time even larger. In all
cases, the PSNR remains pretty large, and in no instance goes below 40dB,
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MaxSteps steps TPR PSNR / (min) Time
500 140 0.80 57.60 / (49.60) 25
1000 165 0.40 54.10 / (46.60) 50
1500 173 0.20 51.70 / (45.00) 78
2000 179 0.01 49.90 / (43.70) 107
2500 184 0.01 48.70 / (42.70) 137
3000 185 0.00 47.90 / (41.90) 164
∞ 185 0.00 47.90 / (41.90) 164
Table 4.2. Performance indicators for the LBP-based detector, PK scenario,
averaged over 100 test images.
MaxSteps steps TPR PSNR / (min) Time
1000 992 0.92 61.47 / (55.56) 945
5000 4127 0.85 56.01 / (49.24) 1515
10000 7877 0.83 53.87 / (46.37) 1637
30000 22168 0.75 50.70 / (42.65) 2311
50000 31010 0.50 49.71 / (40.84) 3000
100000 37588 0.33 49.07 / (40.24) 3842
Table 4.3. Performance indicators for the S3SPAM-based detector, LK
scenario, averaged over 100 test images.
ensuring that the attack is not perceivable by visual inspection. To further
stress this point, we conclude by showing one of the images of Fig.1 after
our attack, both in the PK and LK scenarios. The output images appear
as identical, and identical to the original forged image. Although there
is much room for further research, and better algorithms can be certainly
singled out, our techniques provide already encouraging and sometimes
quite good results, attacking successfully some of the best image forgery
detectors proposed in recent years.
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Attacked Image with Perfect knowlegment Attacked Image with Limited knowlegment
Figure 4.6. Output image after counter-forensic attacks in the PK (left)
and LK (right) scenarios.
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Conclusions
This thesis deals with image source identiﬁcation. In particular, two
diﬀerent type of problems have been faced: PRNU-based blind image clus-
tering and camera model classiﬁcation. In both cases special attention has
been devoted to JPEG-compressed and resized images, so as to mimick the
processing operations that images undergo when posted on social networks.
For what concern the PRNU-based approach, after computing the im-
age noise residuals, correlation clustering and consensus clustering are used
to obtain a ﬁrst conservative data partition, ideally free of false positives.
Then, an ad hoc reﬁnement algorithm is used to obtain the ﬁnal clustering
by alternating PRNU estimate improvement and cluster merging. Results
on several datasets extracted from the Dresden database, both pristine and
resized/compressed, prove the proposed method to outperform the-state-
of-the-art and guarantee higher robustness to image quality impairments.
A remarkable feature of the proposed method is that no user intervention
is required, to provide parameters or external training sets. In addition,
by a judicious choice of clustering and estimation tools, the computational
complexity is always quite limited.
Then, we used the proposed algorithm to face forgery localization in
a blind scenario. After images have been clustered, PRNU is estimated
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and used to tell apart pristine images from forged ones by performing a
pixel-level analysis. Clearly, each step can be a possible source of error
and experimental analysis highlighted how performance degraded because
of the errors introduced at each single step. It turned out that for the orig-
inal images the performance of all clustering algorithms are high enough
to create clusters with a low false positive rate. This allows the forgery
detector to perform as well as in the ideal case. However, in the JPEG-
compressed dataset, a performance drop can be observed since the clus-
tering becomes less accurate and more fragmented. Further experiments
are certainly needed for a full assessment of the performance. In particu-
lar, since practical applications often deal with very large datasets (from
thousands to millions of images), a study of the algorithm behavior in the
presence of PRNU compression [129] or fast method [130] seems necessary.
For the camera model identiﬁcation problem, the use of co-occurrence
based features have been analyzed. Here a diﬀerent level of knowledge on
the training set and pre-processing on images is considered. Then a deep-
learning approach is shown to outperform all state-of-the-art methods,
giving promising results even with small patches.
Finally, the last chapter of this thesis is devoted to machine learning-
based counter-forensics and show that a malicious attacker, aware of the
speciﬁc features used by the system, can easily fool the detector. This
raises up security issues that should be addressed by the researchers in the
next years to provide more robust approaches.
In general, there are several open questions for future research. A ﬁrst
issue is how to merge the PRNU traces with the camera model ones to
improve performance even in terms of speed and accuracy. The extension
to videos is also not trivial, not only for the diﬀerent nature of the data,
but also for the largely increased computational load. Another interesting
scenario arises if an expert attacker performs a counter-forensics approach
to fool the deep learning paradigm [131]. All such problems strongly stim-
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ulate research and make multimedia forensics one of the most attractive
topic in the signal processing ﬁeld.
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